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Jianlin Chen†
Section 120 of the Hong Kong Crimes Ordinances— which traces its
origin to the U.K. and which is replicated in several other English common
law jurisdictions— criminalizes procurement of sexual acts through false
representation. Recently, prosecutors used this provision to indict individuals who procured sexual acts on the pretext of performing luck-improving
religious rituals. Beyond presenting the first-ever systematic examination
of these intriguing fraudulent sex court cases, this Article makes two arguments. First, this Article explains how the strong skepticism, and at times,
instinctive rejection by the judges of the purported religious proclamations
not only confirm the scholarly concerns over the sincerity test in U.S. v.
Ballard, but also demonstrates how the often-proposed solution of bench
trials and other procedural safeguards is of limited efficacy to restrain religious bias. Second, by situating religious fraud with romantic fraud— both
being frauds that raise serious conceptual difficulties in terms of objectively proving falsehood— this Article highlights that fraudulent sex
criminalization is as much a regulation of fraud as it is a sexual offence.
Thus, the inquiry should not only be sensitive to the different normative
considerations that vary with the subject matter of the representations, but
should also incorporate the economic literature regarding the impact of
fraud on market dynamics in appreciating the unintended effects of the
law and prosecutorial decisions.
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Introduction
Rape and sexual offences can excite passionate legal discourse by their
inevitable entanglement with deeply controversial topics such as social
morality, sexual autonomy, and gender equality.1 Throw in fraud and
deception, and it somehow raises the emotional stakes even further. Perhaps unique to this issue, it is not uncommon to find academic commentators who consciously explain or defend the self-perceived passionate tone
employed in their law journal articles.2 The deep and emotive division on
the issue is understandable. Procurement of sex through fraud pits the
intrinsic moral objection (and the accompanying long-standing legal sanctions) of deception in the conduct of human affairs3 against the common
perception that lies are prevalent in sexual relationships.4 Indeed, it is typical for academics to confront the classic scenario of the criminal getting
sex through a dishonest proclamation of love— arguably the most common
form of deception in sex— regardless of their stance on the issue.5 Mean1. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 431,
431– 36 (2016) (framing rape law as an issue of sexual discrimination). See generally
CASSIA SOPHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS
IMPACT (1992) (a discussion of rape reform contemporaneous to the substantial shift in
rape laws from its traditional restrictive stance to its more liberal modern approach);
RETHINKING RAPE LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Clare McGlynn &
Vanessa E. Munro eds., 2010) (an edited collection on rape law reform across the globe
and in international/regional law).
2. See e.g., Michael Bohlander, Mistaken Consent to Sex, Political Correctness and
Correct Policy, 71 J. CRIM. L. 412, 412 (2007) (“The style and tone of my remarks will
betray that the topic causes me more than mere academic engagement. I will confess
from the start that I have no sympathy for Herring’s proposal, and I will make no bones
either about the fact that I view it as an example of exaggerated political correctness . . .”); Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Fundamentals, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 2
n.1 (2015) (“A reader might think that my tone and rhetoric in the Introduction and
throughout this Article are unduly harsh. Indeed, a reader might conclude that I have
some personal animus toward Jed Rubenfeld. However, we have never met and have no
personal connection of which I am aware. My choice to use strong language at times is,
nonetheless, a conscious one.”). See also Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the
Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1780, 1805 (1992) (“Rape is a topic that engenders strong emotions. I would be disappointed if this essay were not deemed provocative; on the other hand, I have not deliberately ground any ideological axe.”).
3. See AARON LEVINE, ECONOMIC MORALITY AND JEWISH LAW 53 (2012); Barbara Biscotti, Debtor’s Fraud in Roman Law: An Opportunity for Some Brief Remarks on the Concept of Fraud, 17 FUNDAMINA: A JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY 1, 2– 10 (2011).
4. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1405 (2013); Hyman Gross, Rape, Moralism and Human Rights,
2007 CRIM. L. REV. 220, 224– 25 (2007). For a collection of various ancient and contemporaneous accounts of deception in sex, see WENDY DONIGER, THE BEDTRICK: TALES OF
SEX AND MASQUERADE (2000).
5. See e.g., David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 461– 62
(2000) (observing that providing a specific exemption for emotional declarations like “I
love you” will negate concerns based on the pervasive nature of deception in love);
Gross, supra note 4, at 222– 25 (questioning the harm— and thus the justification and
desirability of criminalization— to woman who are deceived by an “artful seducer”);
Jonathan Herring, Mistaken Sex, 2005 CRIM. L. REV. 511, 519– 22 (2005) (arguing that
false declaration of love should be punished as rape as part of his general advocacy for
broad interpretation as to the fraud that will vitiate consent).
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while, courts around the world continue to deal with many cases ranging
from the relatively mundane (if no less reprehensible) to the more elaborate. Among these are fraudulent representations that sexual intercourse is
a part of medical and other forms of therapeutic treatment,6 elaborate
deception schemes that co-opt the ease of constructing fake personas over
the internet,7 or the seemingly straightforward lies that raise broader public policy considerations (e.g., sexually transmitted diseases,8 use of birth
control,9 gender,10 and ethnicity11).
Then, there is sex through religious fraud.
In recent years, individuals who procured sexual acts on the pretext of
performing luck-improving religious rituals have been prosecuted in Hong
Kong, a former British colony that continues to operate an English common law legal system after handover of sovereignty to China in 1997.12
The standard modus operandi involves the defendant telling the victim that
he has supernatural power and can perform a religious ritual that can alleviate the victim’s problems, be it secular (e.g., career prospect, health
issues) or occult (e.g., haunting by evil spirits).13 The defendant tells the
victim that sexual intercourse is an integral component of the ritual.14 The
victim believes the defendant and proceeds to have sexual intercourse with
the defendant as part of the purported ritual.15
These individuals are prosecuted under Section 120 of Hong Kong
Crimes Ordinances (hereafter “Section 120”).16 Originating from the U.K.,
and with equivalence found in several other English common law jurisdic6. See e.g., Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); R.
v. Mobilio, [1991] 1 V.R. 339 (Austl.). See Jenny Morgan, Rape in Medical Treatment: The
Patient as Victim, 18 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 403, 404 (1991).
7. See e.g., R v. Bingham, [2013] EWCA Crim 823 § 1 (Ct. App.) (Eng.); R v.
Devonald, [2008] EWCA Crim 527 § 2 (Ct. App.) (Eng.). See J.R. Spencer, Sex by Deception, 2013 ARCHBOLD R. 6, 7– 8 (2013).
8. See e.g., R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371 (Can.); R v. EB, [2006] EWCA Crim
2945 § 8 (Ct. App.) (Eng.). See Martha Shaffer, Sex, Lies, and HIV: Mabior and the Concept of Sexual Fraud, 63 TORONTO L.J. 466, 466 (2013).
9. See e.g., Assange v. Swedish Prosecution Authority, [2011] EWHC 2849 § 2
(Admin) (Eng.). See Athena Katsampes, A Rape by Other Name? The Problem of Defining
Acts of Protection Deception and the University as a Solution, 24 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.
157, 170– 72 (2017).
10. See e.g., R v. McNally [2013] EWCA Crim 1051 (Ct. App.) (Eng.); See Karl Laird,
Rapist or Rogue? Deception, Consent and the Sexual Offences Act 2003, 2014 CRIM. L. REV.
492, 500– 05 (2014)
11. See e.g., Aeyal Gross, Rape By Deception and the Policing of Gender and Nationality
Borders, 24 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 1, 15– 23 (2015) (discussing the Kashur case, where a
Jewish woman consented to sex with an Arab man that misrepresented himself as
Jewish).
12. See Johannes Chan, From Colony to Special Administrative Region, in LAW OF THE
HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 4 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2d ed. 2015).
13. See Hong Kong v. Yeung Shing Sang (
), [2015] H.K.C. 1203.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See Crimes Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 200, § 120 (H.K.).
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tions,17 Section 120 criminalizes the procurement of sexual acts through
fraud as a distinct and lesser offence from rape.18 In addition to a lesser
penalty (5 years vs. life imprisonment), conviction under Section 120 simply requires the defendant to “procure [a sex act] . . . by false pretense or
false representations” rather than by the victim’s lack of consent.19 This
represents a lower conceptual and evidential threshold that merely focuses
the inquiry on whether the false representation made by the defendant was
a material inducement for the victim’s sexual acts.20 This enables the prosecution to secure a high proportion of convictions.21
More crucially, this in turn facilitates an unadulterated critical examination on the normative considerations of criminalizing fraudulent sex.
There has always been extensive scholarly inquiry on fraudulent sex
around the world, the most recent in the U.S. academic circle being the
intense debate sparked by the purportedly controversial 2013 article by Jed
Rubenfeld in the Yale Law Journal.22 However, notwithstanding the copious amount of ink spilled on the subject, the discourse has thus far been
largely subsumed by the vexing and highly controversial issue as to the
extent to which deception vitiates consent and/or violates sexual autonomy,23 or is otherwise distracted by other objections of treating fraudulent
sex as rape, such as fear that the offence of rape may be diluted by incorporation of fraudulent sex.24 The basic question as to what exactly are the
17. See Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 45 (Austl.); Sexual Offenses Act 2010, ch. 99,
§ 7(a)(vi) (Bah.); Sexual Offences Act 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2 c. 69, § 3 (Eng.); Sexual
Offenses Act 2011, § 19 (Jam.). See infra Part I.A.
18. See Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), Dec. 21,
1977, at 334– 39.
19. Crimes Ordinance, supra note 16, §§ 118, 120.
20. For a discussion as to how this Section 120 provision differs from the requirement of rape under U.K. and U.S. jurisprudence, see infra Part I.A.3.
21. Six convictions out of the seven cases surveyed over a ten-year period. See infra
Part 1.II.C.
22. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1327. See also Luis E. Chiesa, Solving the Riddle of
Rape-by-Deception, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 407, 408– 10 (2017); Ben A. McJunkin,
Deconstructing Rape by Fraud, 28 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2014); Patricia J. Falk, Not
Logic, But Experience: Drawing on Lessons from the Real World in Thinking about the Riddle-by-Fraud, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 353, 353 (2013); Gowri Ramachandrana, Delineating
the Heinous: Rape, Sex, and Self-Possession, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 371, 371 (2013); Tom
Doughertya, No Way Around Consent: A Reply to Rubenfeld on “Rape-by-Deception,” 123
YALE L.J. ONLINE 321, 321 (2013); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Sex Without Consent, 123 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 335, 335 (2013).
23. See e.g., Bethany Simpson, Why has the Concept of Consent Proven so Difficult to
Clarify?, 80 J. CRIM. L. 97, 109– 11 (2016); Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1395– 1408. See
Rebecca Williams, Deception, Mistake and Vitiation of the Victim’s Consent, 124 L.Q. REV.
132, 147– 58 (2008) (normatively discussing the possible spectrum mistakes— e.g., “butfor,” “physical difference,” “non est factum”— that may be adopted by the courts/legislators as sufficient to vitiate consent). See also Stuart P. Green, Lies, Rape, and Statutory
Rape, in LAW AND LIES: DECEPTION AND TRUTH-TELLING IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
194, 206– 08 (Austin Sarat ed., 2015) (arguing that sexual autonomy should be conceived “as a bundle of rights organized around the idea of securing for its possessor
various forms of self-determination” rather than a single right that is dichotomously
either violated or not).
24. See e.g., Amit Pundik, Coercion and Deception in Sexual Relations, 28 CAN. J.L. &
JURIS. 97, 123– 25 (2015); Gross, supra note 4, at 224– 25.
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consequences and the corresponding normative considerations of punishing fraudulent sex as an ordinary criminal law offence, or as a species of
fraud regulation has remained largely unexamined.
Beyond the criminal law implications, the fact that the fraud relates to
religious purposes or practices also raises serious conceptual and constitutional questions relating to the core element of the offence. How do the
courts conclude that the defendant’s claims of supernatural power and
that sex acts are part of a religious ritual are false? How does this factfinding process gel with the limitation of the secular state in assessing the
spiritual realm, a core legal principle of modern liberal democracies,
whether under U.S. constitutional law,25 English common law,26 or the
international human rights law as interpreted by the European Court of
Human Rights [“ECtHR”].27
Drawing on this unique intersection among fraud, sexual offence, and
religious liberty, this Article utilizes Hong Kong case law as a case study to
make three contributions.
The first contribution is descriptive. This is the first-ever systematic
and in-depth chronicle of a series of actual fraudulent sex cases dealing
with the intriguing fact patterns of religious deception. This Article assembles a complete set of religious fraudulent sex cases over a ten-year period
in Hong Kong that has thus far been unexamined in the legal literature,
whether in Hong Kong or elsewhere. This lack of scholarly attention is due
to a combination of factors that include language (most of the cases are in
Chinese), accessibility (many of the cases are unreported decisions not
available on any online public/legal database), and perhaps more importantly, the preoccupation with rape and consent to the neglect of an
offence that is neither. This is unfortunate. This detailed formal account
on religious fraudulent sex in a globalized, highly educated, wealthy, and
modern English common law jurisdiction28 represents a fascinating
human story that challenges conventional wisdom, and adds to the various
sociological studies about religion and modern society.29 More impor25. See e.g., Caleb E. Mason, What is Truth? Setting the Bounds of Justifiability in
Religiously-Inflected Fact Disputes, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 91, 93– 104 (2011); Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1831, 1835 (2009); Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses,
90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 44– 45 (2004). See also infra Part II.B.
26. This is under the common law doctrine of non-justiciability as to issues relating
to the truth or falsity of religious doctrines. See Satvinder S. Juss, The Justiciability of
Religion, 32 J.L. & RELIGION 285, 291– 94 (2017); Peter Smith, The Problem of the NonJusticiability of Religious Defamations, 18 ECC. L.J. 36, 40– 42 (2016).
27. See EUR. CT. H.R., RESEARCH DIV., OVERVIEW OF THE COURT’S CASE-LAW ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION 19 (2013); see also Nicholas Gibson, Faith in the Courts: Religious Dress
and Human Rights, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 657, 686– 87 (2007).
28. See generally INFO. SERV. DEP’T, HONG KONG IN BRIEF (2016); SELIM JAHAN, U.N.
DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2016 198 (2016). For a concise and
legal-oriented historical account of Hong Kong, see Chan, supra note 12.
29. For analysis and discussion about the continued flourishing of religion and
superstitious beliefs in an increasingly modern and secular social environment, see
Dong-Kyu Kim, Reconfiguration of Korean Shamanship: Tradition and Modernity in the
Construction of Korean Shamans’ Self-Identity, 15 ACTA KOREANA 369, 389– 90 (2012); see
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tantly, the cases serve as a cornerstone for this Article’s second and third
contributions that focus on the practical and normative considerations surrounding criminalizing religious fraud and fraudulent sex.
Indeed, the second contribution draws on a key feature of the Hong
Kong cases to help resolve the academic debate regarding the purported
sincerity test espoused by the majority opinion in U.S. v. Ballard.30 U.S. v.
Ballard is the landmark case on religious fraud that has recently received
renewed scholarly attention due to both the controversy of granting religious exemption to corporations under Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,31 and the
media reports on perceived fraudulent practices by televangelists and other
purported religious leaders.32 As interpreted by subsequent courts and
commentators, the majority in Ballard stood for the proposition that even
though the constitutional safeguard of religious liberty (including the
Establishment Clause consideration) prohibits the court from investigating
whether a religious claim is objectively true or false, the court may examine
whether the alleged fraudsters sincerely believe their religious claims.33
The debate in the literature revolves around whether this sincerity test is
sufficient. On one hand, Kent Greenawalt34 and William Marshall35
agreed with the Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion that the purported distinction between impermissible evaluation of the truth of religious belief
and permissible determination of the sincerity of that belief are more illusionary than real.36 On the other hand, scholars such as Paul Horwitz37
also Christopher Dole, Mass Media and the Repulsive Allure of Religious Healing: the Cinci
Hoca in Turkish Modernity, 38 INT’L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 31, 50– 51 (2006).
30. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 84– 87 (1944).
31. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). See also Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens:
How Courts May (and Why They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion under RFRA, 85 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 94 (2017); Sean Nadel, Closely Held Conscience: Corporate Personhood in
the Post-Hobby Lobby World, 50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 417 (2017); Ben Adams &
Cynthia Barmore, Questioning Sincerity: The Role of the Courts after Hobby Lobby, 67
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 59 (2014).
32. See e.g., Nicholas Barborak, Saving the World, One Cadillac at a Time: What Can
be Done When A Religious or Charitable Organization Commits Solicitation Fraud?, 33
AKRON L. REV. 577 (2000); Jacob M. Bass, The Sermon on the Mountain of Cash: How to
Curtail the Prosperity Scheme and Prevent Opportunists from “Preying” on Vulnerable
Parishioners, 37 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 147 (2017); Mark Davis, Prosperity Gospel Fuels Jet
Scandal: Pastor’s Request for $65M Plane Criticized by Many, ATLANTA J.— CONST., July 8,
2015, at A1; Abby Ohlheiser, Comedian John Oliver Takes on the Prosperity Gospel by
Becoming a Televangelist, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/08/17/comedian-john-oliver-takes-on-the-prosperitygospel-by-becoming-a-televangelist/?utm_term=.0031713b8222 [https://perma.cc/
N38V-8432].
33. Notwithstanding common perception and subsequent court citation to the contrary, the Supreme Court did not in fact directly hold that the sincerity test may be used
for securing conviction of religious fraud, but merely that question of religious truth
cannot be put to the jury. See infra Part II.B.1.
34. See KENT GREENAWALT, 1 THE RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND
FAIRNESS 115– 16 (2006).
35. See William P. Marshall, Smith, Ballard, and the Religious Inquiry Exception to the
Criminal Law, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 239, 255 (2011).
36. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 92– 93.
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and Stephen Senn38 argued that the sincerity test is desirable and permissible, especially when coupled with proposed procedural and substantive
safeguards.39 Nathan Chapman goes further saying that even the jury
would be able to properly apply the sincerity test with only limited changes
to existing procedural rules.40 Underlying this debate are the differing
assumptions as to how factfinders would actually go about the fact-finding
process— assumptions that had not been even anecdotally examined given
the paucity of actual religious fraud prosecutions in the United States and
the prevalence of jury trials where there is no provision of the reasoning
process.41
Against this backdrop, the fact that the majority of these Hong Kong
cases are bench trials in which the judges are required to articulate the
reasons for their findings of facts provides a rare and valuable glimpse as to
the actual reasoning processes in dealing with the veracity of religious
statements. The law in Hong Kong, especially as articulated by the appellate court, is similar to that in the United States. The falsity of the religious
claim is supposed to be established via the sincerity of the defendant (i.e.,
whether the defendant sincerely believed in the claims and/or sincerely
intended to perform religious rituals).42 However, reading the trial judges’
judgments closely reveals the judges’ strong skepticism, and at times
instinctive rejection of the veracity of any representations that sexual intercourse is an integral part of religious rituals.43 The fact that professional
English common law judges— in a jurisdiction that purportedly has a high
regard for international human rights in general and religious freedom in
particular44 and which is consistently ranked highly in international ranking of rule of law45— succumb so readily to the common instinct of bias
and discrimination against perceived incredulous religious claims is telling. With the appropriate caveat, as to the cultural and jurisprudential differences of Hong Kong, this case study suggests that the often-proposed
solution of bench trials and other procedural safeguards that is premised
on entrusting judges with an elevated gatekeeper role is likely of limited
efficacy to restrain unconstitutional religious bias.
37. See Paul Horwitz, Scientology in Court: A Comparative Analysis and Some Thoughts
on Selected Issues in Law and Religion, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 147– 50 (1997).
38. See Stephen Senn, The Prosecution of Religious Fraud, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 325,
336– 41 (1990).
39. See infra Part II.B.3.
40. See Nathan S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1185,
1189– 91 (2017).
41. See infra Part II.B.3.
42. See Hong Kong v. Au Yeung Kwok Fu, [2012] H.K.C. 223, ¶ 33 (C.A.); infra Part
I.C.2.
43. See infra Part I.C.
44. The Hong Kong courts regularly refer to decisions from the U.S., Canada and
ECtHR to reach purportedly robust interpretations on civil liberties. See Johannes Chan
& C.L. Lim, Interpreting Constitutional Rights and Permissible Restrictions, in LAW OF THE
HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 565, 576– 77 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2d ed. 2015);
Daniel R. Fung, Constitutional Reform in China: The Case of Hong Kong, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J.
467, 472– 73 (2004).
45. See WORLD JUST. PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2016 5 (2016).
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Moving from the religious liberty literature to the criminal law literature, the third contribution engages with the existing discourse over fraudulent sex criminalization to introduce a new perspective: criminalization of
fraudulent sex is as much a regulation of fraud as it is a sexual offence.
Given the emphasis on rape and the corresponding focus on consent
and sexual autonomy, existing academic discourse over the criminalization
of fraudulent sex primarily focuses on the extent to which such criminalization shapes and redefines the sexual relationship.46 However, a salient
feature of the preceding argument regarding religious liberty is that the
argument only applies to procurement of sex involving false religious
claims. This salience is best highlighted with reference to sex by false
romantic pretense. Romantic fraudulent sex and religious fraudulent sex
both raise serious conceptual difficulties in terms of objectively proving
falsehood. Falsifying the defendant’s claim that one is a deity and/or has
supernatural power is as fraught with difficulties as attempting to define
and verify the “love” in “I love you.”47 However, as evidenced by this case
study, such falsehood could be established by combining an inquiry of the
defendant’s sincerity with certain assumptions as to what would inherently
constitute false claims. Although there have been no prosecutions of
romantic fraudulent sex, there are— ironically— more justifications to prosecute romantic fraudulent sex than religious fraudulent sex. The fact that
modern, secular courts are less constitutionally precluded in defining love
when compared to religion renders the almost inevitable practice by judges
(and juries) to determine what constitutes legitimate religion/love when
applying the sincerity test. Moreover, the state is supposedly indifferent to
engagement in sexual intercourse for self-interest (for example, improving
one’s luck), especially in contrast with sex in pursuit of love.
To be clear, this Article is not advocating for the prosecution of romantic fraudulent sex or, for that matter, religious fraudulent sex. Rather, by
unpacking the different legal and normative implications inherent in
criminalizing romantic and religious fraudulent sex, this Article underscores that criminalizing fraudulent sex does not just redefine sexual relationships, it also regulates the subject matter of the falsehood, be it about
religion, love, or other forms of false manipulations.
This new perspective brings forth two implications. First, it supports
selective criminalization of fraudulent sex that targets representations
involving certain subject matter (e.g., medical treatment, marital status,
and sexually transmitted disease). Such criminalization, often enacted by
the legislature in response to public outcry over a not-guilty rape verdict
46. See Herring, supra note 5, at 523– 24. See ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, REDEFINING RAPE
33– 51 (2013) (discussing the historical evolution of the penalizing seduction in the context of the underlying social attitudes towards sex). Cf., McJunkin, supra note 22, at
21– 34 (arguing that the law’s reluctance to criminalize fraudulent sex reflects an underlying notion of seduction based on normative masculinity where men derive power and
social status through sexual conquest). See infra Part III.D.
47. See Bryden, supra note 5, at 468– 70; STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE
CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 155– 58 (1998). See also infra Part
III.B.
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premised on the distinction between fraud in the factum versus fraud in
the inducement,48 has been criticized for its ad hoc nature and failure to
systematically address the underlying deficiency of sexual offences law.49
Nonetheless, from the perspective of fraud regulation, the varied normative
considerations of criminalization among different subject matter of representation may justify such an approach.
Second, in line with recent attempts to move the discourse on general
rape law beyond the confines of criminal law,50 this Article’s conceptualization of fraudulent sex criminalization as a form of fraud regulation
incorporates the economic literature on fraud’s impact on market dynamics. In particular, the concept of credence goods points to the normative
ambiguity of using Section 120 and other deceptive sex offences to prosecute fraudulent sex involving hard-to-verify falsehoods, including religious
fraud. Credence goods is an economic term for goods and services whose
quality cannot be judged before or after purchase or consumption, thus
elevating the supplier’s credibility as a particularly salient consideration in
the consumers’ calculus.51 Given the severe information asymmetry for
consumers, a whole host of government interventions ranging from licensing and certification to expanding sellers’ liability have been advocated to
protect consumers and ensure proper functioning of the market.52 However, where the state is in no better position than the consumer to evaluate
the product— as with the case of religion, given its allusion to divinity, spiritual realms, and other unverifiable concerns— can such state interventions
unduly enhance the credibility of the supplier without any corresponding
increase in quality. In the context of this case study, this Article argues
that by unintendedly imbuing large swaths of unprosecuted, but otherwise
dubious, practices with a perceived aura of legality, the prosecution of
48. See infra Part III.D.
49. See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39,
101 (1998); Simon H. Bronitt, Rape and Lack of Consent, 16 CRIM. L.J. 289, 296– 98
(1992).
50. See e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) be a Crime, 100 MINN.
L. REV. 221, 223– 25 (2015) (arguing for the use of Title IX enforcements by the Department of Education to reduce the amount of nonconsensual sex on campus); Margo
Kaplan, Rape Beyond Crime, 66 DUKE L.J. 1045, 1048– 51 (2017) (arguing for an alternative public health framework to more holistically tackle the multifarious causes of sexual
violence and coercion); see also Galia Schneebaum, What is Wrong with Sex in Authority
Relations? A Study in Law and Social Theory, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 345, 379– 85
(2015) (arguing that sex within authority relations should not be punished as a sex
offence, but as a lesser offence of abuse of office as part of anticorruption regulation).
51. See Uwe Dulleck, Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, The Economics of
Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 526, 526– 27 (2011); Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer,
On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods, 44 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 5, 6– 9 (2006); Winand Emons, Credence Goods and Fraudulent
Experts, 28 RAND J. ECON. 107, 107 (1997).
52. See Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, The Regulation of Quality in the Market
for Legal Services: Taking the Heterogeneity of Legal Services Seriously, 10 EURO. J. COMPARATIVE ECON. 267, 284– 85 (2013); Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A
Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328, 1329, 1342 (1979).
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religious fraudulent sex in Hong Kong is at risk of encouraging activities
and transactions that the courts and prosecutors wish to discourage.
This Article is organized into four parts. Part I lays out the case study
of Hong Kong by discussing the background and context of Section 120,
the facts and proceedings of the prosecution, and how the courts approach
the issue of falsity. Part II engages with the literature on prosecuting religious fraud under the sincerity test and explains how the inherent judicial
bias revealed in this case study confirms the harm of such prosecution and
indicates the limited efficacy of the proposed procedural safeguards that
rely on judges to restrain discriminatory impulses. Part III situates the
case study with romantic fraudulent sex to highlight how fraudulent sex
criminalization is as much a regulation of fraud as it is a sexual offence
and how such a conception can justify selective criminalization of fraudulent sex on the basis of the subject matter or context of the employed
deception. Part IV draws from economic literature to demonstrate the
counterproductive nature of Hong Kong’s prosecution of religious fraudulent sex.
I.

Law in Context

A.

Background

1.

Legal and Social Backdrop

Hong Kong is an autonomous jurisdiction under the sovereignty of
China since its handover from the British in 1997 after slightly over 150
years of colonial rule.53 It retains its English common law judicial system,54 and the bulk of its legislation (including its criminal law) remains
based on corresponding English statutes.55 Hong Kong’s 7.3 million population is predominantly Chinese (95%).56 According to the Pew Research
Center’s 2012 global survey of religious groups, the religious composition
of Hong Kong population is, in order of proportion, unaffiliated (56.1%),
Christian (14.3%), Buddhist (13.2%), affiliated with Chinese folk religions
(12.8%), Islamic (1.8%), affiliated with other religions (1.4%) and Hindu
(0.4%).57 Notably, ritualistic practices associated with Chinese folk religions and/or superstition are practiced by many in the population, including those who claim no religious affiliation.58
53. See Chan, supra note 12.
54. See Johannes Chan, The Judiciary, in LAW OF THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 361,
361 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2d ed. 2015); Kwai Hang Ng, Is There a Chinese
Common Law? An Empirical Study of the Bilingual Common-Law System of Hong Kong, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 118, 119– 20 (2011).
55. See MICHAEL JACKSON, CRIMINAL LAW IN HONG KONG 25– 30 (2003).
56. See INFO. SERV. DEP’T, supra note 28, at 44– 45.
57. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 47 (2012).
58. See Joseph Bosco, Chinese Popular Religion and Hong Kong Identity, 14 ASIAN
ANTHROPOLOGY 8, 9– 13 (2015); Joel Thoraval, The Western Misconception of Chinese
Religion: a Hong Kong Example, 3 CHINA PERSPECTIVES 58, 63– 64 (1996).

R
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The Provision in Question

The focal point of this case study, Section 120, currently stipulates59
under the heading “Procurement by false pretences”:
(1) A person who procures another person, by false pretences or false representations, to do an unlawful sexual act in Hong Kong or elsewhere shall be
guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to
imprisonment for 5 years.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), pretence or representation includes a
pretence or representation relating to the past, the present or the future and
any pretence or representation as to the intention of the person using the
pretence or representation or any other person.60

This offence is distinct from rape, defined as having “unlawful sexual
intercourse with a woman who at the time of the intercourse does not consent to it” and punishable by “imprisonment for life.”61 Section 120 was
added into Hong Kong law in 1978 together with a whole of host of other
offences relating to prostitution,62 all of which reflect the underlying legislative objective of tackling the exploitation of women and girls for the purposes of prostitution.63 The provision was based on the near identically
worded Section 3 of the U.K. Sexual Offences Act 1956, which in turn
could be traced back to a provision enacted in 1885 to protect women from
being lured into prostitution.64 This provision has been replicated in other
English common law jurisdictions, such as Australia,65 Jamaica,66 and the
Bahamas.67
59. The provision has been amended twice since the provision was enacted in 1978.
The first amendment was made in 1991, when the originally worded “sexual intercourse” was amended to the current “sexual act” as part of the extension of provisions
“designed to offer women and girls protection from sexual exploitation” to men and
boys. See Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), Apr. 17,
1991. The second amendment was made in 2000, when section 120(3) was removed in
its entirety. Section 120(3) previously provided the requirement of collaboration for conviction of section 120. The abolishment was again a relatively straightforward amendment given how the requirement of collaboration has been abolished in other contexts a
few years prior. See Legislative Council Secretariat, Report of the Bills Committee on Evidence (Amendment) Bill 1999, June 7, 2000, LegCo Paper No: CB(2)2215/99-00, at 6– 8.
60. Crimes Ordinance, supra note 16, § 120.
61. Id. § 118.
62. For example, the offence of “trafficking [for the purpose of prostitution]”
(§ 130), “causing prostitution” (§ 131), “living on earnings of prostitutions of others”
(§ 137), “letting of premise for use as vice establishment” (§ 143).
63. See Official Reports of Proceedings (Legislative Council of Hong Kong), Dec. 21,
1977, at 334– 39.
64. See Spencer, supra note 7, at 6. The provision was abolished in the U.K. during
2003 reforms, though academics have opined that this is due to a legislative oversight
rather than a deliberate decision. Simpson, supra note 23, at 107; Laird, supra note 10,
at 499.
65. See Crimes Act, supra note 17, § 45. The state of New South Wales previously
had a similar provision but repealed it in 2003. See Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 66
(Austl.).
66. See Sexual Offences Act, supra note 17, § 19.
67. See Sexual Offences Act, supra note 17, § 7(a)(vi). The Caribbean Community, a
regional intergovernmental organization of Caribbean nations, issued model legislation
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Before continuing to discuss the concept of consent under English
common law, it is apt to clarify here that the “unlawful” in “unlawful sexual act/intercourse” has been interpreted by the U.K.68 and Hong Kong
courts69 as being essentially “surplusage”70 because it covers all sexual
acts and intercourse, whether within or outside of the context of marriage.
3.

Relationship with Rape

On the issue of what sort of deception will vitiate consent, the English
common law position is that deception must relate to the “nature of the
act” to vitiate consent for the purpose of rape and indecent assault.71 This
is similar to the U.S. position in which the fraud has to be in the factum as
opposed to fraud in the inducement.72 Thus, the otherwise much cited and
criticized U.S. case Boro v. Superior Court would likely be decided the same
way in Hong Kong.73 Whereas the U.K. and Hong Kong courts have held
that penetration as part of medical treatment goes to the “nature of the act”
element and thus could constitute rape, the facts in those cases are such
that the penetration was not described by the defendant as sexual intercourse.74 Thus, if the defendant had fraudulently stated that sexual intercourse was part of the medical procedure as in Boro, the fraud is to the
“purpose of the act.”75 This would not sustain a conviction of rape,76 at
least prior to the 2003 legislative reform in U.K. that has expanded the
category of fraud to expressly encompass “purpose of the act.”77 A similar
reform is proposed in Hong Kong.78
Notably, Section 120 dispenses even with this more relaxed test of
consent post legislative reform.79 There is no restriction as to the type
and/or category of fraud that will constitute the offence. Indeed, the
for sexual offences that includes this distinct lesser offence. See CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY
(CARICOM) SECRETARIAT, MODEL LEGISLATION ON SEXUAL OFFENCES § 6 (1991).
68. See Regina v. R, [1992] 1 A.C. 599, 610– 11 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
69. See Au Yeung Kwok Fu, H.K.C. 223 ¶¶ 25– 30.
70. See Regina, 1 A.C. at 610– 11.
71. See Laird, supra note 10, at 495– 98; Williams, supra note 23, at 133– 36. For an
academic discussion right before the 2003 law reform in the U.K., see DAVID SELFE &
VINCENT BURKE, PERSPECTIVES ON SEX, CRIME AND SOCIETY 79– 86 (2d ed. 2001).
72. See McJunkin, supra note 22, at 9– 12; Falk, supra note 49, at 157– 61. For criticisms that this distinction is unsatisfactorily contingent to how specific the act is
described, see ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 206 (2003).
73. 210 Cal. Rptr. at 122. See McJunkin, supra note 22, at 10 (describing the case as
“probably the most cited rape by fraud case in American history”).
74. See R v. Williams, [1923] 1 K.B. 340 (C.A.) (Eng.); R v. Flattery, [1877] 2 Q.B.D.
410 (C.A.) (Eng.). See Chan Wai Hung v. Hong Kong, [2000] H.K.C.U. 611, at 3– 6
(C.F.A.) (surveying and approving a line of relevant U.K. and Hong Kong cases).
75. See Boro, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
76. In 2000, the highest court in Hong Kong emphasized that “the law is concerned
with the nature of the act and not its purpose.” Chan Wai Hung, H.K.C. at 2.
77. Sexual Offences Act 2003, c. 42, § 76 (U.K.). For an overview of the reform, see
generally Jennifer Temkin & Andrew Ashworth, The Sexual Offences Act 2003: (1) Rape,
Sexual Assaults and the Problems of Consent, 2004 CRIM. L. REV. 328, 328– 46 (2004).
78. See LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF HONG KONG, CONSULTATION PAPER: RAPE AND
OTHER NON-CONSENSUAL SEXUAL OFFENCES 43– 44 (2012).
79. See Crimes Ordinance, supra note 16, § 120.
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breadth of the provision can be best observed in relation to the scenario in
which the defendant had sex with a prostitute on the promise of payment,
but the defendant had no intention of fulfilling the promise. Even the
broader “nature or purpose of the act” test could not encompass this scenario.80 However, Section 120 can be and indeed has been employed on several occasions in Hong Kong to convict such individuals.81
B.

Cases on Sex by Religious False Pretenses

Despite the media’s prominent reporting of such cases,82 there has not
been any systematic inquiry, whether in the academic legal literature or
otherwise. This case study assembles all the court decisions involving the
use of Section 120 to prosecute sex by religious false pretenses within the
ten-year period from March 2007 to March 2017. This was achieved by
first searching for all prosecutions of Section 120 via the relevant search
term83 in the electronic legal database, Lexis HK,84 and the official judiciary website for judgments.85 In addition, requests were made to the judiciary for court judgments that were discussed or mentioned in the
searchable judgments, but which were otherwise not found on the electronic databases. In total, there are eleven cases.86 Among these, seven
cases concerned religious fraud and form this case study’s subject matter.
The conviction rate is high, with only one acquittal among these seven
cases.87
80. See R v. Linekar, [1995] Q.B. 251 (C.A.) (Eng.). See also RICHARD CARD, ALISDAIR
GILLESPIE & MICHAEL HIRST, SEXUAL OFFENCES 56– 57 (2d ed. 2008) (arguing that “purpose” does not include the “wider purpose,” such that a therapist fraudulently inducing
a client to have a “threesome” on the pretext of a cure for depression, when instead it is
for the therapist’s own sexual gratification, does not contravene the provision since such
scenario is akin to the Linekar case).
81. See e.g., Hong Kong v. Guan Zhonghong, DCCC599/2015 (D.C. Aug. 20, 2015)
(Legal Reference System) (H.K.); Hong Kong v. Feng Guohao, DCCC712/2015 (D.C.
Oct. 20, 2015) (Law Reference System) (H.K.); Hong Kong v. Nyamdoo Zoljargal, HCMA
157/2014 (C.F.I. May 13, 2014) (Legal Reference System) (H.K.). One Hong Kong judge
has correctly recognized the economic (and not sexual) nature of the crime. See
Nyamdoo Zoljargal, supra note 81, ¶ 6. Commentators have made similar critiques. See
Bryden, supra note 5, at 466– 67.
82. See e.g., HK01, https://www.hk01.com/tag/14108 [https://perma.cc/5LQMHLSE] (last visited Feb 1, 2018). For an example of the extensive and sordid reporting of
an earlier case, see Laurence Zuckerman, Hong Kong’s Seductive Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
17, 1991).
83. The search starts with judgments mentioning/citing the provision, followed by
searching judgments that include key phrases of the provision, such as “procurement by
false pretences” to ensure completeness.
84. See LEXIS HK, https://www.lexisnexis.com/hk/legal/.
85. See LEGAL REFERENCE SYSTEM, http://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/judg
ment.jsp (last visited Feb. 1, 2018). Both databases have substantial but incomplete
overlaps at the time of the search, i.e., some cases can only be searched in one of the
databases despite the supposed comprehensive nature of both databases.
86. This number is broadly similar to the total of sixteen cases during the eleven-year
period from 2001 to 2011, as revealed by the Law Reform Commission in a 2012 Consultation Paper. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF HONG KONG, supra note 78, at 68.
87. See Hong Kong v. Luo Weiluo, DCCC1105/2015 (D.C. Feb. 20, 2015) (Legal
Reference System) (H.K.).
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To better appreciate how the courts deal with the issue of falsity, the
key facts of the seven cases are set forth as follows, with particular focus on
(1) the age of the victim and defendant at time of first offence; (2) how the
victim and defendant met; (3) the specifics of the false pretense; (4) the
number of times of sexual intercourse and duration between first and last
intercourse; (5) how the case reached the police; and (6) the defendant’s
defense. The facts are based on the court verdicts save for the last case (as
arranged in chronological order), in which the defendant was acquitted.
For that last case (Law Wai Leuk),88 the victim’s testimony is presented.
1.

Hong Kong v. Au Yeung Kwok Fu89

The victim was eighteen, and the defendant was fifty-two. The victim
was a model and was introduced to the defendant by the victim’s modeling
agent. Notably, it was the victim’s modeling agent who told the victim that
the defendant could improve her career-related luck and that the ritual
would involve sexual intercourse. The defendant performed the ritual nine
times over a period of eight months. The victim went to the police after she
discovered she was pregnant, despite purported assurance by the defendant that the unprotected sex during the ritual would not make her
pregnant.90
The defendant admitted to the sexual intercourse and testified that he
performed the luck-improving rituals.
2.

Hong Kong v. Wong Mei Yin & Lo Fun Yi91

The victim was nineteen, and the defendant was sixty-three. The victim’s “godmother” told the victim that the victim’s room was haunted. The
victim’s “godmother” then told the victim that she (the “godmother”) knew
of a priest who could perform an exorcism ritual, but the ritual would
involve sexual intercourse. The defendant performed the ritual twice over
a period of three days. The victim’s “godmother” was present and naked
during the second ritual and fondled the victim’s breast while the defendant had sexual intercourse with the victim.92 The victim made a police
report after reading about the aforementioned Au Yeung Kwok Fu case in
the newspaper about a month after the rituals.93
88. See infra Part I.B.7.
89. DCCC 569/2009 (D.C. Dec. 12, 2009) (Legal Reference System) (H.K).
90. The victim underwent an abortion. DNA testing confirmed that the victim was
impregnated by the defendant.
91. DCCC70/2010 (D.C. Aug. 4, 2010) (Legal Reference System) (H.K.).
92. The “godmother” was actually charged together with the defendant. Her charges
were “aiding and abetting” the defendant in procuring sex by false pretenses. She was
acquitted since the judge found that she believed the defendant’s lies, and thus had no
intention of deceiving the victim. By way of background context, the defendant (who
was married) had been having an affair with the “godmother.”
93. The victim did mention the rituals (including the sexual intercourse) to her older
sister (who was pursuing graduate education at that time) about ten days after the rituals. The victim’s older sister— who gave testimony at trial— felt that it was a little strange
but did not pursue the matter. The victim decided to report to the police after discuss-
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The defendant admitted to sexual intercourse and testified that it was
consensual and was desperately initiated by the victim.
3.

Hong Kong v. Chow Kam-Wah94

The victim was nineteen, and the defendant was fifty-one. The victim
and the defendant lived in the same public-housing estate. The victim was
introduced to the defendant by a mutual acquaintance who learned that
the victim believed a ghost was following her. The defendant told the victim that he could perform a exorcism ritual but that sexual intercourse was
part of the ritual. The defendant performed the ritual three times over a
period of three months. Four months after the last ritual, the defendant
drove the victim to a deserted spot (after driving her to collect her wages)
and forcibly had sexual intercourse with the victim. The victim made a
police report thereafter.
The defendant admitted to all the sexual intercourse and testified that
it was consensual, with no talk of ghosts or exorcism, and the sexual intercourse was based on monetary considerations.
The defendant was convicted of rape in addition to the three charges
under Section 120.
4.

Hong Kong v. Ho Ka Po Tony95

The victim was twenty-seven. The defendant’s age was not mentioned
in the judgment. The victim was a domestic helper from Indonesia and
had back pains that did not respond to a family doctor’s medical treatment.
The victim’s agent suggested this might be due to the victim being under a
“Tame Head” spell96 and brought the victim to the defendant’s office. The
defendant said that he would cure her and proceeded to engage in sexual
acts with the victim while alluding to purported religious rituals (e.g.,
prayer to a Buddhist figurine). This was repeated four days later, although
the charge for that instance was procurement by threat in light of how the
defendant told the victim that she would be in trouble if she did not submit. The victim later told the incidents to her employer, who accompanied
her to make a police report.
The defendant elected to remain silent during the trial.

ing the matter with her friend in light of the newspaper report of the Au Yeung Kwok Fu
case.
94. Hong Kong v. Chow Kam-wah, HCCC 80/2010 (C.F.I. Nov. 30, 2010) (Legal
Reference System) (H.K.).
95. Hong Kong v. Ho Ka Po Tony, DCCC 1169/2012 (D.C. Apr. 29, 2013) (Legal
Reference System) (H.K.).
96. “Tame Head,” also known as “gong tao,” is a form of black magic practiced in
South East Asia. For a case study account, see generally Bertha Mo, Black Magic and
Illness in a Malaysian Chinese Community, 18 SOC. SCI. & MED. 147 (1984).
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Hong Kong v. Yuen Yuk Kin97

The victim was fifteen. The defendant’s age was thirty-three. The
defendant was the boyfriend of the victim’s older sister. The victim had
frequent fevers, and the defendant told the victim that this was because the
victim’s boyfriend’s spirit was left in the victim’s body after the victim and
her boyfriend had sex.98 The defendant told the victim that to exorcise the
ghost and to improve her luck, he could perform a ritual that involved sexual intercourse. Over a period of six years, they had regular sexual intercourse, allegedly on this pretense. The victim went to the police after the
victim’s request to end the rituals prior to entering university was met with
angry resistance by the defendant.
The defendant admitted to sexual intercourse and testified that it was
consensual, without the alleged pretenses, and that the exorcism and luck
improvement ritual he actually performed did not involve sexual intercourse. The defendant agreed with the prosecution that sexual intercourse
had no exorcism or luck improvement effect.
6.

Hong Kong v. Yeung Shing Sang99

The victim was thirty-eight, and the defendant was thirty-nine. The
victim was introduced to the defendant by the victim’s twin sister, who told
the victim that the defendant “was a God with magical powers” and could
help the victim’s intellectually-disabled son. The defendant was at the time
the lover of the victim’s twin sister. The ritual, purported to help the victim’s son and to help the victim’s romantic relationship, involved the defendant first inserting a sausage and his fist with the accompanied instruction
that the victim would “expel [it] by simulating the movements of childbirth.” The defendant then inserted his penis, of which the victim protested, and the defendant withdrew. The ritual was done in the presence of
the victim’s twin sister. The victim and the victim’s twin sister went to the
police the next day. Forensic evidence later revealed that a drink offered by
the defendant to the victim was laced with methamphetamine (“ice”).
The defendant did not give evidence at trial and relied on police statements that claimed the sex with the victim was with consent, that the withdrawal was due to him being disconcerted by the presence of the victim’s
twin sister, and denied the insertion of sausage and fist.
Notably, the defendant was also charged and convicted of rape
because the defendant never told the victim that sexual intercourse (as
opposed to insertion of sausage and fist) was part of the religious ritual.
97. CACC 454/2011 (C.A. Jan. 15, 2013) (Legal Reference System) (H.K.).
98. See id. Victim admitted that she had three sexually active boyfriend-girlfriend
relationships prior to the age 16.
99. Hong Kong v. Yeung Shing Sang, CACC 374/2013 (C.A. May 20, 2014) (Legal
Reference System) (H.K.).
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Hong Kong v. Law Wai Leuk100

This was the only case where the defendant was acquitted. The following account is based on the victim’s testimony.
The victim was twenty-four, and the defendant was forty-two. The victim was introduced to the defendant by the victim’s colleague. The defendant used cards to tell the victim’s fortune and predicted she would have a
boyfriend who would be twelve years older than her. A year later, the victim had a boyfriend who was indeed twelve years older but whose luck had
not been good. The defendant said he could help change said boyfriend’s
luck with a ritual that involved sexual intercourse. The rituals were performed four times over the period of a year. The victim made a police
report six months after the last ritual, which followed an alleged molestation (which the defendant was also acquitted of) that purportedly took
place five months after the last ritual.
The defendant admitted to sexual intercourse and testified that it was
consensual and based on sexual fulfillment without the pretext of performing rituals.
8.

Summary: Patterns in the Facts

Although the facts of the seven cases have significant variations in
terms of their specifics, such as the age difference between the defendant
and victim and the frequency and duration of the interactions before the
conduct stopped, certain broad similarities can be garnered from these
seven cases.
First, when the defendant initially makes the representation regarding
the religious rituals, there is no prior religious and/or fiduciary relationship between the victim and defendant. There is also no power disparity
between the victim and the defendant, with perhaps the exception of the Ho
Ka Po Tony case, where the victim is a foreign domestic helper and may
have felt somewhat beholden to the defendant even if the defendant had no
employment relationship with the victim. Indeed, the victim is often introduced to the defendant by the victim’s acquaintances, friends, or even family members who thought that the defendant possessed supernatural
means and could help the victim.
Second, none of the cases involved organized and/or established world
religions. The religious premise of all the defendants’ representations was
Chinese folk religions. “Chinese folk religions” is a label that broadly
encompasses worship of a diverse multiplicity of deities and other rituals/
practices imbued with veneration and/or supernatural dimensions (e.g.,
ancestor worship, fortune-telling, and geomancy).101 Ritualistic practices
100. Hong Kong v. Law Wai Leuk, DCCC 1105/2015 (D.C. Feb. 3, 2017) (Legal
Reference System) (H.K.).
101. See Wai Yip Wong, Defining Chinese Folk Religion: A Methodological Interpretation, 21 ASIAN PHIL. 153, 158– 65 (2011). See Fenggang Yang & Anning Hu, Mapping
Chinese Folk Religion in Mainland China and Taiwan, 51 J. SCI. STUD. RELIGION 505,
508– 11 (2012) (discussing the evolution and controversies in the definition of Chinese
folk religion and arguing Chinese folk religion can be further categorized into three
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associated with Chinese folk religions are commonly practiced in Hong
Kong, even if many who practice report no religious affiliation.102
Third, the purported rituals were transactional in nature, whereby the
victim was hoping for divine intervention for specific problems, be it secular (e.g., improving a modeling career, son’s mental capacities) or supernatural (e.g., exorcism, removal of a curse). This reflects the religious
premise of the defendants’ representations. Unlike monotheistic religions,
which are often based on faith in the designated supreme and the goal of
eternal salvation,103 Chinese folk religions are more oriented as an
exchange relationship between the deity and the adherent, whereby religious rites are performed with the expectation of favorable divine intervention into daily affairs.104 It is also significant that the victim’s underlying
demand for the transaction was not created or induced by the defendant—
no defendant actively sought out his victims (at least not directly)105 or tell
the victim that she was suffering from a curse or followed by a ghost. If the
defendant created the “reason” for the transaction, especially where the
“reason” is severe (e.g., curse and other grave supernatural consequences),
then arguably the defendant can be prosecuted for procuring sex by threats
or intimidation.106 One key advantage of prosecuting with the procurement by threats offence is that the objective truthfulness of the threat is
irrelevant for conviction.107
types— namely communal folk religion, sectarian folk religion and individual folk religion— based on their differing level of belief and organization, and different social
functions).
102. See Tik-sang Liu, A Nameless but Active Religion: An Anthropologist’s View of Local
Religion in Hong Kong and Macau, 174 CHINA Q. 373, 373 (2003).
103. See Sarah Claerhout & Jakob De Roover, Conversion of the World: Proselytization
in India and the Universalization of Christianity, in PROSELYTIZATION REVISITED: RIGHTS
TALK, FREE MARKETS AND CULTURE WARS 53, 65 (Rosalind I.J. Hackett ed., 2008); David
Tracy, The Christian Understanding of Salvation-Liberation, 7 BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN STUD.
129, 130– 32 (1987).
104. See C. HARRY HUI, EDDIE C. W. NG. & M. HANNAH TAI, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION 145 (David A. Leeming, Kathryn Madden & Stanton Marlan eds.,
2010); Liu, supra note 102, at 389.
105. The acquaintance who introduced the defendant to the victim could also be
charged under Section 120 if the acquaintance knowingly made the false representation/pretext. Indeed, the original understanding of the U.K. equivalent was that the
clause was meant to prosecute the third parties that facilitate the sexual intercourse,
rather than the individual who actually engaged in the intercourse, and it took an early
court case to establish otherwise. Spencer, supra note 7, at 6– 7. This was indeed what
happened in Wong Mei Yin & Lo Fun Yi, though curiously as an “assisting and abiding”
offence rather than the offence itself. See supra Part I.B.2.
106. See Crimes Ordinance, supra note 16, § 119 (“A person who procures another
person, by threats or intimidation, to do an unlawful sexual act in Hong Kong or elsewhere shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to
imprisonment for 14 years.”).
107. See Hong Kong v. Chan Wing Hung, CACC000430/1996 (C.A. July 15, 1997)
(Legal Reference System) (H.K.) (upholding a conviction under § 119 of an ex-boyfriend who threatened to release sex tapes if the victim did not have sex with him, even
though there were no such sex tapes); see also PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT:
THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT
188– 89 (2004) (arguing that the Boro case should be analyzed via the perspective of
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Whereas the first and third themes do not directly implicate the legal
elements of Section 120, they do indicate the priorities and considerations
underpinning each prosecutor’s decision108 to pursue the case and will be
discussed further in Part III’s examination of the impact of such enforcement on individuals’ behaviors. The second theme, as will be discussed in
the next section, implicates the manner in which falsehood is established.
C.

Evaluating Falsity

Falsehood is the integral element of Section 120. However, where the
pretense is religious or supernatural in nature,109 difficult conceptual and
evidential issues arise. Whereas courts and states in the past have had
little problem making determinations as to what constitutes false religion
and/or heresy,110 contemporaneous discourse of religious liberty—
whether with or without an accompanying anti-establishment consideration— has duly recognized the limitations on the desirability and capabilities of the modern secular courts to assess religious and spiritual
matters.111 Given the allusion to supernatural forces and divine intervention, there is no ready source of evidence that can provide straightforward
verification of the truthfulness of such claims.
This is particularly so, as in this Hong Kong case study, where the
religious premises of such claims are not those of either organized or established world religions.112 Insofar as the defendant purports to practice a
religion with clearly articulated and defined doctrines, it is possible—
although still extremely complicated and highly controversial— for secular
‘force’ and ‘threat’ rather than fraud given how the defendant “conditionally placed [the
victim] in fear of her life.”).
108. The Department of Justice has an Attorney General whose prosecutorial discretion and independence is enshrined in the Basic Law (Hong Kong’s de facto constitution). See The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s
Republic of China, adopted by the National People’s Congress on April 4, 1990, 29
I.L.M. 1551 (1990), at art. 63. See Wong Yan Lung, The Secretary of Justice as the Protector of the Public Interest: Continuity and Development, 37 HONG KONG L.J. 319, 334– 48
(2007) (discussing the judicial respect of prosecutorial discretion in Hong Kong and
issues of accountability).
109. A distinction should be made from a claim that relates to religion, but is based
on secular factual claim— for example, claiming that one was a head monk/priest in a
particular famous temple. These sorts of claims are capable of ready verification and do
not pose particular problems distinct from conventional fraud claims. See Senn, supra
note 38, at 328– 29.
110. See WILLIAM SALKELD, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH
WITH SOME SPECIAL CASES IN THE COURTS OF CHANCERY, COMMON PLEAS AND EXCHEQUER
162 (1795) (highlighting a 16th century English case, Dominus Rex versus Lady Portington, which held that under the monarch’s power and obligation to “see that nothing
be done to . . . “Propagation of a false Religion,” the monarch may order a trust for “a
superstitious use” to be applied to a “proper use”). For a discussion of the Medieval
Inquisition, arguably the most systematic attempt at policing religious truth in history,
see Carole A. Myscofski, The Magic of Brazil: Practice and Prohibition in the Early Colonial
Period, 1590-1620, 40 HIST. RELIGION 153, 157– 58 (2000); see also Margaret Mott, The
Rule of Faith over Reason: The Role of the Inquisition in Iberia and New Spain, 40 J.
CHURCH & ST. 57, 66– 67 (1998).
111. See Koppelman, supra note 25, at 1835; See Shiffrin, supra note 25, at 44– 45.
112. See supra Part I.B.1.
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courts to determine the correct religious doctrine for that religion and
whether the defendant had misrepresented the doctrine.113 However, such
avenues are closed in the Hong Kong cases. Indeed, in the two cases where
the defendant did testify and gave evidence as to his religious practices (Au
Yeung Kwok Fu114 and Luo Wei Lue115), both defendants stressed that their
religious practices were not related to Daoism. Although objectively that is
likely to be the case, notwithstanding the fluidity and breadth of the concept of Daoism as a religion,116 it is also notable that the prosecution
presented at trial a Daoist religious expert who testified that Daoist rituals
would never include non-spousal sexual intercourse, even though the relevancy of the expert’s testimony is undercut by the defendant’s position.117
As we shall see, how the Hong Kong court actually approached the
factual issue of falsehood in each of the seven cases was closely connected
to how the defendant chose to mount his defense.
1.

Defendant’s Concession as to Falsity

The easiest case is arguably Yuen Yuk Kin, in which the defendant
agreed that sexual intercourse had no exorcism or luck improvement
effect.118 This admission meant that in order to establish the key actus reas
element of procuring sex under false pretenses, the court just needed to
believe the victim’s testimony that the defendant did actually tell the victim
that sexual intercourse was an integral part of the religious ritual.119
2.

Defendant’s Insincerity

Compared to the defendant in the Yuen Yuk Kin case, the defendant in
the Au Yeung Kwok Fu case directly asserted that sexual intercourse was
part of the religious ritual. Indeed, the defendant proffered three witnesses
with whom the defendant had performed religious rituals, involving sexual
intercourse, to the individuals’ satisfaction (i.e., the individuals testified
that they felt the rituals were effective in improving luck or providing
miraculous health benefits).120 This placed the veracity of the religious
claims at the forefront of the trial.
In finding the defendant guilty, the trial judge expended a large portion of the judgment on detailing the many inconsistencies in the defendant’s testimony. For example, the trial judge noted that whereas the
defendant claimed that during the sexual intercourse, his body was pos113. See Smith, supra note 26, at 37– 38 & 51– 52; Mason, supra note 25, at 93– 104;
Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493, 550– 56 (2013).
114. See Au Yeung Kwok Fu, H.K.C. 223, ¶¶ 46– 48.
115. See Hong Kong v. Luo Wei Lue, DCCC 1105/2015 (D.C. Feb. 3, 2017) (Legal
Reference System) (H.K.).
116. See Jiexia Elisa Zhai, Contrasting Trends of Religious Markets in Contemporary
Mainland China and in Taiwan, 52 J. CHURCH & ST. 94, 100– 01 (2010).
117. See Luo Wei Lue, DCCC 1105/2015; Au Yeung Kwok Fu, H.K.C. 223.
118. Hong Kong v. Yuen Yuk Kin, CACC 454/2011 (C.A. Jan. 1, 2013) (Legal Reference System) (H.K.).
119. See id.
120. See Au Yeung Kwok-Fu, H.K.C. 223.
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sessed by divine spirit and he had no recollection or control of his actions,
he was still able to provide details of the sexual intercourse in his testimony. Other examples of inconsistency involved the conditions he stipulated regarding the performance of the rituals, where his claim as to the
specific location and timing requirements for ritual were not always followed in all the rituals.121 Although this suggests that the trial judge purported to use these inconsistencies to challenge the sincerity of the
defendant’s belief that sexual intercourse was an integral part of the religious rituals, the trial judge went on to opine that,
I neither accept nor believe that any religion or belief which has helping
others and advocating kindness as its fundamental value will coopt mortal
sexual lust as a component of religious worship/rituals. If there are really
such teachings, I consider them as only belonging to heretics and evil cults
which sought to use these teachings and twisted logics to satisfy one’s
desire. These people are packaging sexual intercourse as a religious or mystical product.122

If only to complicate matters, the trial judge then referred to
paragraphs 21– 33 of HK Archbold 2010 (an authoritative commentary on
criminal law in English common law jurisdictions) and “opined that prosecution need not conclusively prove that the representation/pretense [that
the defendant has the power to improve the victim’s luck] is false.”123
Unsurprisingly, this case was appealed. The key legal issue was
whether the falsity of the “pretense” must be established for conviction.124
The Court of Appeals found the trial judge mistakenly relied on HK
Archbold 2010 and then held that the correct legal principle is that the
prosecution is not required to specify the falsity of the representation/pretense in the indictment.125 The Court of Appeal went on to find that
despite the trial judge’s mistake, the prosecution established the pretense’s
falsity.126 The various and major inconsistencies in the defendant’s testimony demonstrated that the defendant was not “sincere in improving the
luck of the victim” when he had sexual intercourse with the victim.127
It is somewhat fortunate that the Court of Appeals was on hand to
clarify the otherwise muddled approach by the trial judge in Au Yeung
Kwok Fu. The Court of Appeals in Au Yeung Kwok Fu did not explicitly
explain why it held that evidence demonstrating the defendant’s insincerity in improving the victim’s luck through sexual intercourse was sufficient
to satisfy the element of falsity of the representation. However, given how
the material representation directly concerned the defendant’s purported
divine ability to improve the victim’s luck, the Court of Appeals was likely
driven to its conclusion due to religious freedom considerations. Indeed,
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See id. ¶¶ 130– 33.
Id. ¶ 141.
Id.
See id.
See id. ¶ 32.
See id.
Id. ¶ 33.
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this is also probably why the trial judge in Au Yeung Kwok Fu was keen to
rely on HK Archbold, so as to avoid the need of expressly finding the falsity
of the purported religious claim, even if the judge was not at all shy to
express his intense skeptical opinion of the claim.
In Hong Kong, the right to religious freedom is secured through the
verbatim adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights [“ICCPR”] via the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance.128 Hong
Kong courts have not directly addressed this clause via-a-vis religious
fraud. In the few cases that involved constitutional claims for violations of
religious freedom and/or religious exemptions to generally applicable laws,
the Hong Kong courts have typically found that the claims were religious
and focused the inquiry on whether there were sufficient justifications for
the restrictions.129 In the absence of direct precedence, jurisprudence
from ECtHR will be instructive. When interpreting the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights Ordinance, Hong Kong courts have regularly cited ECtHR decisions
as persuasive authority, unsurprisingly given how the European Convention on Human Rights closely resembles the ICCPR.130 The ECtHR, in
turn, has consistently held that the state is not permitted to assess the
legitimacy of religious beliefs, given the duty of neutrality and impartiality
under the religious freedom clause of the European Convention on Human
Rights.131 Moreover, even without this constitutional protection, English
common law courts have frequently invoked the doctrine of non-justiciability to hold that “issues of the truth or falsity of religious doctrines
were non-justiciable” and dismissed litigation in which such issues are an
essential legal component.132
128. As a general matter, either the Basic Law or the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance will suffice in providing grounds for a constitutional challenge, whereas the
ICCPR may serve as a constraint against repeal or amendment of the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights Ordinance without providing an independent source of enforceable rights itself.
See Dinusha Panditaratne, Basic Law, Hong Kong Bill of Rights and the ICCPR, in LAW OF
THE HONG KONG CONSTITUTION 521, 538– 59 (Johannes Chan & C.L. Lim eds., 2d ed.
2015); Simon N. M. Young, Restricting Basic Law Rights in Hong Kong, 34 HONG KONG
L.J. 109, 115– 17 (2004).
129. See e.g., Chu Woan Chyi v. Secretary for Justice, CACV 119/2007 (C.A. Sept. 4,
2009) (Legal Reference System) (H.K.) (finding that Falun Gong is a religion under constitutional law); Brian Alfred Hall v. Secretary for Justice, [2005] H.K.C. 1324 (C.F.I)
(H.K.) (recognizing listening of reggae music as integral to Rastafarian faith). Cf., R v.
Yuen Chong, [1996] 3 H.K.C. 205 (C.A.) (H.K.) (in the context assessing the common
law doctrine of “religious mortification” as a potential defense from the infliction of
harm, finding that corporal punishment is not an accepted form of punishment in the
Taoist religion given the lack of evidence, such as testimony to the effect).
130. See Chan & Lim, supra note 44, at 576– 77; Roda Mushkat, International Law in
HKSAR Courts, 28 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 353, 371– 75 (1998).
131. See EUR. CT. H.R., RESEARCH DIV., supra note 27, at 19. See also Anna Su, Judging
Religious Sincerity, 5 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 28, 36– 37 (2016) (discussing the recent
emergence of the sincerity test to replace the belief-conduct distinction that was previously used to manage religious accommodation challenges under ECtHR
jurisprudence).
132. See Frank Crammer, Editorial, Thomas Phillips v. Thomas Monson, 16 ECC. L.J.
393, 393 (2014) (noting how a private prosecution against a Mormon church leader for
soliciting religious contributions “while at the same time knowingly promoting theological doctrines which ‘might be untrue or misleading’” was summarily dismissed for,
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Under such jurisprudential constraints, it is apt that the Hong Kong
Court of Appeals in Au Yeung Kwok Fu relied on the defendant’s insincerity
as the basis of establishing falsehood. This allows the court to uphold the
conviction without having to directly confront the vexing issue of how to
falsify a religious claim. As Anna Su observed in her recent analysis of how
the Canadian courts and the ECtHR have adopted a sincerity test in assessing whether a practice falls under the scope of the respective constitutional
provisions as a religious exemption, “[i]n confining themselves to a familiar
comfort zone of assessing witness credibility, judges avoid choosing
dogma and from implicating themselves in possible religious
controversies.”133
At this juncture, it is worth noting that the sincerity of the defendant’s
belief (as opposed to insincerity) may also come into play in negating criminal liability. One key reason for the acquittal in Law Wai Leuk is that the
judge found the defendant to be as superstitious as the victim, and thus,
the prosecution could not establish that the defendant himself did not
believe in the religious rituals involving sexual intercourse.134 This is the
standard mens rea requirement, in which the defendant has to be aware of
the falsity of his representations to be convicted of fraud crimes.135
3.

Assumption of Falsehood?

However, the sincerity test poses a particular problem when the defendant elects to remain silent and does not provide any evidence, as in Ho Ka
Po Tony. Whereas the court can evaluate the credibility of the victim and
find that the defendant did make claims relating to the supernatural purposes of sexual intercourse, there are no testimonial inconsistencies on the
part of the defendant to readily establish the defendant’s insincerity. This
latter issue was, in fact, completely side-stepped in Ho Ka Po Tony. After
finding that the victim was a credible witness and that her factual account
was accurate, the trial judge simply concluded that “I was sure that on 26
July she was deceived into believing that what the defendant was performing was some form of religious ritual intended to remove problems caused
by her having been cast as a ‘Tame Head.’ ”136 There was no discussion as
to why the pretense of the “Tame Head” curse removal was a deception. It
is possible that the judge was inferring the defendant’s lack of sincerity
from the fact that after the first occasion of sexual intercourse, the defenamong other things, “issues of the truth or falsity of religious doctrines were non-justiciable.”). For a discussion of the doctrine of non-justiciability of religious issues in the
English courts, see Juss, supra note 26, at 291– 95.
133. Su, supra note 131, at 39.
134. See Luo Wei Lue, DCCC 1105/2015 (H.K). The other reason for the acquittal is
that the judge did not find that the victim was a credible witness, and the circumstances
of the sexual intercourse (e.g., taking place on Boxing Day which was the date commonly associated in Hong Kong with lover’s sexual activity) suggested that the sex was
really for mutual sexual gratification. Id. ¶¶ 97– 119.
135. See GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW 251– 54 (2016); JACKSON, supra note 55, at
731– 32.
136. Ho Ka Po Tony, DCCC 1169/2012 (H.K.) ¶¶ 38– 46.
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dant threatened the victim that “she would have trouble” after she was hesitant to engage in sexual intercourse on the pretext of the “Tame Head”
curse removal.137 Nonetheless, given how the trial judge in Au Yeung Kwok
Fu instinctively veered into opining that sexual intercourse cannot, as a
matter of fact, be part of a legitimate religious ritual, it is likely that the
judge in Ho Ka Po Tony operated under similar skepticism.
The sincerity test also does not operate well when the defendant testifies that the sex was voluntary without any reference to the religious pretenses, as in Wong Mei Yin & Lo Fun Yi. There, the trial judge— having
found the victim as a credible victim— determined that the defendant did
make the representation that sexual intercourse was a necessary part of the
exorcism ritual. However, the falsity of the representation was established
through the trial judge determining— in a sentence without any discussion— that the representation “was false, without any basis, and that ordinary reasonable and honest people will deem such representation as
false.”138 Notably, no expert witnesses were called regarding the religious
practices nor any admission elicited from the defendant as to the falsity of
the representation. Thereafter, the trial judge found that the defendant did
not believe the representation was true.139
Similarly, whereas the nature of a jury trial for Chow Kam-wah140 prevented a more detailed analysis as to how the falsehood was established,
the way the judge summarized the facts during sentencing echoed a presumptive approach. The judge simply noted that “[t]he defendant told the
victim that the sexual intercourse was part of the exorcism ritual. The
defendant thus procured sexual intercourse with the victim by falsely representing that by having sexual intercourse with him the ghost following
the victim would be exorcised.”141 This can be contrasted with the conviction for rape, where the judge noted that the defendant “raped the victim”
because the “evidence disclosed that . . . the defendant forcibly removed
her shorts and underpants and had sexual intercourse with her against her
will.”142 For the later rape conviction, all the elements of the crime— in
particular the most critical “against her will” element— are set out in the
fact summary. Nonetheless, it appears that the judge thought that the falsity of the representation that sexual intercourse would exorcise a ghost
was either self-evident or could otherwise be presumed.

137. See id. ¶ 19.
138. Wong Mei Yin & Lo Fun Yi, DCCC70/2010 (H.K.) ¶ 103.
139. See id. ¶ 104.
140. Given the concurrent rape charges, the case was tried at the court of first
instance (a higher-level court than the district court where trials involving Section 120
are conducted) where jury trial is the default. See High Court Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 4,
§§ 12, 33A (H.K.); Criminal Procedure Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 221, § 41 (H.K.).
141. Chow Kam Wah, HCCC80/2010 (C.F.I. Nov. 30, 2010) (Legal Reference System) (H.K.), at 2.
142. Id.
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Summary: Crude Sincerity Test

In summary, the approach applied by the Hong Kong courts can be
described as a crude sincerity test. When pressed, especially on appeal,
the court will acknowledge that the proper and straightforward way of
finding falsehood is through questioning the sincerity of the defendant’s
belief in the religious pretense.143 However, it is also common to detect a
judge’s inherent skepticism of any claims relating to how religious rituals
involve sexual intercourse. The judge in Wong Mei Yin & Lo Fun Yi was
quick to find that the representation was false on the grounds that “ordinary reasonable and honest people” will deem it as false.144 Tellingly, the
bold (if honest) rejection by the trial judge in Au Yeung Kwok Fu, of religion
as part of a legitimate religious ritual was not clarified or challenged on
appeal. Thus, the purported focus on the defendant’s sincerity is in practice underpinned by an objective assessment of what constitutes genuine
religious practices.
II.

Falsity in Religious Fraud

The formal adoption of the sincerity test to adjudicate the falsity of
religious claims, and the actual reliance on judges’ intuition to determine
what constitutes true religion should come as no surprise to U.S. readers,
given the copious amount of literature surrounding the Supreme Court
case of U.S. v. Ballard.145 This part of the Article presents the case and the
corresponding academic debate regarding the constitutionality and desirability of the purported sincerity test espoused in the Ballard decision. This
Part then demonstrates how the Hong Kong experience suggests that the
proposed solutions of bench trials and other procedural safeguards would
remain insufficient to restrain religious bias.
A.

U.S. v. Ballard146

Given the case’s prominence and regular featuring in the literature, a
brief summary of the facts and legal holdings will suffice here. The two
defendants, being mother and son, were charged and convicted of using
and conspiring to use mail to defraud. The defendants led the religious “I
Am Movement.”147 According to the indictments, they claimed (together
143. See id. at 2– 3.
144. Wong Mei Yin & Lo Fun Yi, DCCC70/2010 (H.K.) ¶ 103.
145. 322 U.S. 78.
146. Id.
147. From the perspective of religious studies, the “I Am Movement” is categorized as
New Age spirituality that originates from the metaphysical movement. A key feature of
such movements is the recognition of subtle energies that may be transformed by individuals to serve the objectives of the individuals (in particular healing), and the corresponding commodification and commercialization of such spiritual services. See
Catherine L. Albanese, The Subtle Energies of Spirit: Explorations in Metaphysical and New
Age Spirituality, 67 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 305, 316– 21 (1999); see also Leo Preffer, The
Legitimation of Marginal Religions in the United States, in RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 9, 23– 24 (Irving I. Zaretsky & Mark P. Leone eds., 1974) (arguing
that the de facto legitimation of new religious movements like the “I Am Movement” was
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with their deceased husband/father) to be divine messengers of the divine
entity Saint Germain and thereby had supernatural powers to cure diseases
that are medically incurable. They utilized such claims to solicit funds
from the public.148 During trial in the district court, the government and
the defendants agreed that the jury would only decide whether the defendants honestly and in good faith believed their claims, but would not decide
whether those claims were actually true.149 The defendants were convicted
by the jury, and later appealed, arguing that the question put to the jury
was different from the indictment.150 The court of appeals agreed and
ordered a new trial. Then, the government appealed.151
The U.S. Supreme Court decision was split three ways. The majority,
delivered by Justice Douglas, allowed the appeal and remanded the case to
the court of appeals on the basis that it erred in implying that the question
of religious truth should be put to the jury.152 The majority held that the
religious freedom guaranteed under the First Amendment precluded the
state from pronouncing whether a religious claim is true or false.153
Justice Jackson dissented. He agreed that the basic tenet of religious
freedom is the right to maintain and practice beliefs that are otherwise
deemed heresy and implausible by orthodox or majority faiths. However,
he thought that the conviction should be quashed outright because religious freedom remained unconstitutionally violated, even under the purported inquiry into the defendants’ sincerity of their belief. He observed
that it is not possible in practice or theory to “separate an issue as to what
is believed from considerations as to what is believable,” given how such
separation is contrary to common experience in evaluating falsity.154
There was another separate dissent by Chief Justice Stone (joined by
Justice Roberts and Justice Frankfurter), which reached the opposite conclusion from Justice Jackson. Chief Justice Stone thought that the conviction in the district court should be upheld. For him, the withdrawal of the
factual issue of the truth of the religious statement did not amount to an
amendment to the indictment.155 In addition, he considered it constitutionally permissible for the defendants to be convicted for fraudulent misrepresentation of their state of mind. Further, he was also open to the
due to how the “felt need to protect the gullible from fraud” is ultimately outweighed by
the American constitutional tradition’s aversion to be involved in theological disputes,
even if not always observed in practice, such as in the case of upholding convictions
under statutes prohibiting fortune telling).
148. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 79– 80.
149. See id. at 81– 82.
150. See id. at 82– 83.
151. See id. at 83.
152. See id. at 86– 88. The court of appeals did state that “whether such representations were false or true was a question which should have been submitted to the jury,”
however, that statement was made vis-à-vis the issue as to whether the question put to
the jury is consistent with the indictment. Ballard v. U.S., 138 F.2d 540, 545 (9th Cir.
1943).
153. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86– 88.
154. Id. at 92– 93.
155. See id. at 90– 91.
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notion that falsity of religious experiences that include an objectively verifiable component (e.g., physical presence at a location on a particular day)
could be established by evidence refuting that particular component (e.g.,
the defendant was physically present in some other place on that particular
day).156
B.

Religious Freedom and Sincerity Test

U.S. v. Ballard has subsequently, and frequently, been cited by
courts157 and academics158 as standing for the proposition that courts
may inquire into only the sincerity of the defendant’s belief and not the
veracity of that belief. This is technically incorrect, as pointed out by Stephen Senn and others, because the holding of the majority was framed in
the negative— the jury could not be faced with a question as to the veracity
of the belief, with nothing explicitly said on whether a sincerity test could
be used to convict the defendants.159 In a way, the common understanding of the case is the fusion of the reasoning of the majority with the prescribed outcome under Chief Justice Stone’s dissent that expressly
endorsed the existing conviction premised on the defendants’ sincerity.160
Regardless, this doctrinal quibble is largely immaterial. The judicial evaluation of the claimants’ sincerity in their belief regarding a purported religious claim has been firmly established as an acceptable practice,161
whereas the academic literature has focused on pitting the (perceived)
majority endorsement of the sincerity test against Justice Jackson’s dissent
that sought to rule out the sincerity test.
156. See id. at 89– 91. The other example provided is about claims of curing diseases
and evidence that no such cures are affected. John Noonan identified the ambiguities
about these seemingly straight forward examples. The reporter of the religious experience may simply get his geography wrong, and the claimed cures might be “permanent
or temporary, physical or psychological, organic or psychosomatic.” John T. Noonan. Jr.,
How Sincere Do You Have to be to be Religious?, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 713, 717– 18 (1988).
157. See e.g., U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965); Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn., 46
Cal. 3d 1092, 1112, 1134– 35 (1988).
158. See e.g., John Richard Burkholder, “The Law Knows No Heresy:” Marginal Religious Movements and the Courts, in RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 27,
32 (Irving I. Zaretsky & Mark P. Leone eds., 1974); Jorge O. Elorza, Secularism and the
Constitution: Can Government be Too Secular?, 72 U. PITT L. REV. 53, 110– 11 (2010);
Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in Religion, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887, 892– 93 (2009).
159. See Bass, supra note 32, at 162; see also Senn, supra note 38, at 333– 35.
160. Some commentators who recognized that the majority did not explicitly cordon
the sincerity test have argued that this reading is “implied.” See Chapman, supra note
40, at 1205 (arguing that while the “Court did not squarely hold that the government
may adjudicate religious sincerity and punish insincere statements that amount to
fraud, [ ] its disposition of the case strongly implied that result. It declined to agree—
twice— with Jackson’s powerful arguments that the First Amendment prohibits prosecutions for insincerity.”); see also GREENAWALT, supra note 34, at 115 (“What is confusing is
that, without explicitly saying so, the opinion implies, as the district court had held, that
a fraud conviction may be based on insincerity . . . .”).
161. See Chapman, supra note 40, at 1188– 89; Su, supra note 131, at 31– 34. See
Nadel, supra note 31, at 442– 44 (examining the different legal contexts in which the
party’s sincerity is examined as a pertinent element in litigation).
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Delineating the Debate

Before delving into the specific debate regarding sincerity tests in the
prosecution of religious fraud, it is important to extricate the inquiry from
two related contexts. First, the debate should be distinguished from the
controversy of using of a sincerity test as a precondition for the grant of
religious exemptions from generally applicable statutes. The familiar tension between religious liberty and fraud prevention permeates the issue of
whether claimants of such religious exemptions have to demonstrate that
they are sincere in their religious beliefs. On the one hand, there are concerns over how a sincerity test conflates veracity with sincerity and may
discriminate against minority or unpopular religions.162 On the other
hand, there are the costs of not weeding out insincere religious claims. As
explained by Nathan Chapman, the costs are threefold: (1) the increased
costs on the state or public arising from the undeserved legislative accommodation and benefits, (2) the danger of “suspicion creep,” in which the
court utilizes or develops other doctrines to deny the suspected claim,
thereby potentially harming legitimate claims, and (3) the erosion or dilution of value of religious liberty in the eyes of public.163
However, there is an important distinction between the religious fraud
and fraudulent claims of religious exemptions that parcel out the latter for
the purpose of this Article’s examination of the sincerity test. Targets of
religious fraud are free to assess the veracity of the purported religious
claims and thereupon reject those claims (and be relieved from fraud) if
they find the claims unusual, implausible, or objectionable on any other
grounds, however whimsical. The state, on the other hand, is constitutionally prohibited from making such an assessment. Thus, regardless of
whether a sincerity test is ultimately unconstitutional and/or undesirable,
there is a greater justification for its use in fraudulent claims of religious
exemptions, given its greater prevalence in the absence of a sincerity test or
other forms of state intervention.164
The second context that should be distinguished are objectively verifiable frauds that don’t invoke religion. Commentators such as Kent Greena162. See Su, supra note 131, at 41– 43; Michael Kagan, Refugee Credibility Assessment
and the “Religious Imposter” Problem: A Case Study of Eritrean Pentecostal Claims in Egypt,
43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1179, 1218– 20 (2010) (arguing that the sincerity test is a trap
of circular logic that ultimately returns to the original conundrum of religious
credibility).
163. See Chapman, supra note 40, at 1212– 22. For similar arguments, see Peter J.
Riga, Religion, Sincerity, and Free Exercise, 25 CATH. L. 246, 258– 61 (1980); see also John
O. Hayward, Religious Pretenders in the Courts: Unmasking the Imposters, 20 TRINITY L.
REV. 24, 41– 64 (2014) (arguing that the judges should be more vigilant against “religious pretenders” seeking to unjustly claim religious exemption through adopting an
objective test, in addition to sincerity, of what constitutes religion).
164. See also Noonan, supra note 156, at 718– 24 (distinguishing between fraud
against the government, such as religious exemptions and tax exemption claims— and
fraud against another citizen, stating that there is more justification for state intervention in the former, though preferably through the question of is it religious rather than
sincerity).
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walt,165 David Austin,166 and Jorge Elorza167 have adopted Chief Justice
Stone’s argument that prosecuting such secular facts is constitutionally
uncontroversial and normatively desirable. On the other hand, Marjorie
Heins, relying on Justice Jackson’s dissent, argued that there should not
only be a prohibition of litigation involving fraudulent claims that are religious, but also when claims are made in a religious context.168 Similarly,
Caleb Mason opined that it is not prudent to criminally prosecute religious
fraud (even those with empirically testable claims) on account of danger of
heresy trials,169 even if she disagreed with Justice Jackson’s view on immunity for religiously-inflected fraudulent activity and argued that judges may
adjudicate any matters that may be empirically tested.170 This Article is
sympathetic to the latter position. Even if the prosecutor, judge, and jury
are able to make the appropriate delineation between the religious claims
and secular claims, it is likely that members of the general public would
fail to pick up on this nuanced distinction and simply perceive the trial as
targeting false religions or fraudulent religious practices.171 Nonetheless,
this is a broader issue as to how fraudulent schemes that draw on the trust
of religious associations or affiliations should be tackled by the state.172
This is conceptually and normatively distinct from the issue as to the use
of a sincerity test to falsify objectively unverifiable religious claims and that
will not be examined further in this Article.
2.

Arguments from Both Sides

Having distinguished these two disparate contexts, the terrain of the
discourse on the use of a sincerity test in prosecuting religious fraud can
be more clearly mapped out. In essence, the core debate revolves around
whether the fact finders (i.e., judge and/or jury) are, in actual practice, able
to properly execute a sincerity test without surreptitiously adjudicating the
veracity of the religious claims or discriminating against minority and
unpopular religions.
The seemingly simple and principled nature of Justice Jackson’s exclusion of even the sincerity test in religious fraud prosecution has attracted
165. See GREENAWALT, supra note 34, at 115– 17.
166. See David E. Austin, “In God we Trust”: The Cultural and Social Impact of Affinity
Fraud in the African American Church, 4 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
365, 405 (2004).
167. See Elorza, supra note 158, at 110– 11.
168. See Marjorie Heins, “Other People’s Faiths”: The Scientology Litigation and the Justiciability of Religious Fraud, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153, 157– 58 (1981).
169. See Mason, supra note 25, at 101– 02.
170. See id. at 138– 39.
171. Cf. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF HONG KONG, REPORT: CHARITIES 20, 104 (2013)
(observing how the public commonly perceived the list of organizations that have been
granted charitable tax exemption status as a formal and supervised register of charitable
organizations even if the producer of the list— the tax authority— had no legal authority,
and did not in fact, engage in any active monitoring of the activities of the
organizations).
172. See e.g., Bass, supra note 32; Austin, supra note 166.
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much support among scholars.173 These scholars reaffirmed Justice Jackson’s rationale that the sincerity of a belief could not be independently
evaluated from the veracity of the belief. Michael Kagan observed that
“[t]he sincerity test will be, in most cases, a trap of circular logic that ultimately returns to the original conundrum of religious credibility. . . . The
sincerity test can work only by making assumptions about how a religious
person would talk or act.”174 William Marshall noted that the process of
investigation would inevitably and problematically require asking the
believer to explain or justify his/her belief.175 Relatedly, John Noonan worried that the sincerity test could be problematic for conventional religious
professionals who have lost their faith but continue to perform the rituals
of their religions.176 Justice Jackson’s point about indeterminate harm of
religious fraud also resonates. Bernadette Meyler categorized the conflict
between the majority and Justice Jackson as the dispute as to whether religious value should be “embodied . . . in the sincerity of the founders of the
religions” or “assess[ed] . . . through the eyes of the receiver.”177 Stephen
Rosenthal argued forcefully for the constitutionality of regulations targeting kosher fraud. Nonetheless, he made the distinction between situations
in which the alleged harm of the fraud is purely spiritual (e.g., fortune
telling or palm reading) and situations such as kosher fraud in which there
is “a set of objectively verifiable characteristics as well as a clear market
value”178 and acknowledged that Justice Jackson’s rationale remains persuasive of the former.
Opponents of Justice Jackson’s blanket prohibition typically acknowledge such concerns as legitimate and alive. Nonetheless, they opine that
appropriate procedural and/or substantive safeguards will be sufficient to
mitigate those concerns to a tolerable level. Stephen Senn argued in favor
of prosecuting religious fraud because victims are particularly susceptible,
given the relationship imbalance between religious leaders and adherents
and that religion would be corrupted in the eyes of the public if religions
are frequently exploited by charlatans.179 Recognizing constitutional concerns, he argued for procedural safeguards such as (1) inadmissibility of
improper evidence (e.g., attempts by prosecutors to ridicule the religion);
(2) the right to bench trial and more latitude in jury dismissal; (3) more
specific jury instructions; (4) the judge requiring a heightened evidentiary
standard before passing on the question to the jury; and (5) a more robust
review at appeal (although not necessarily a de novo review).180
Paul Horwitz is worried about how courts will try to get to fraudulent
religions via other means that might collaterally harm legitimate religions
173. See e.g., Kagan, supra note 162, at 1218– 20; Marshall, supra note 35, at 255.
174. Kagan, supra note 162, at 1218– 20.
175. See Marshall, supra note 35, at 255.
176. See Noonan, supra note 156, at 718– 24.
177. Meyler, supra note 158, at 893– 94.
178. Stephen F. Rosenthal, Food for Thought: Kosher Fraud Laws and the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951, 985– 88 (1997).
179. See Senn, supra note 38, at 328– 32.
180. See id. at 336– 41.
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(e.g., decreasing the threshold or scope of constitutional protection for
religious liberty for all religions) and thus argues in favor of prosecuting
religious fraud.181 To deal with concerns of religious liberty, he argues for
substantial rules to regulate the scope of prosecution. These include (1)
limiting the type of individuals who may be prosecuted to those “who, with
a fraudulent and insincere motive, invent and benefit from a religion or a
religious doctrine;”182 (2) a broad conception of what constitutes religious
speech (e.g., healing) in which only sincerity but not veracity may be
assessed; and (3) restricting the evidence that may be admitted to prove
insincerity to (i) testimony, statements, or reliable testimony concerning
admissions against interest by the defendant, (ii) coexistence of relevant
secular fraud, and (iii) evidence of concealment.183
Such proposals have softened the objections by those who would do
away with sincerity tests altogether. Kent Greenawalt opined that the “wisest course is not to have prosecution for fraud about spiritual matters” but
did not take it as constitutionally mandated and is open to Stephen Senn’s
procedural safeguards as a “reasonable alternative” to pursue such prosecutions using a sincerity test.184 Likewise, whereas Ira Lupu recognizes the
inherent bias against unknown or unpopular religions in insincerity tests,
he is sympathetic to how procedural safeguards in the form of specific jury
instructions and a more robust appellate review (i.e., doctrine of constitutional fact) might mitigate the problems.185
At the other end of the spectrum is Nathan Chapman, who argues that
courts can and should adjudicate religious sincerity under ordinary pleading and evidentiary standards.186 For him, the constitutional and normative considerations of religious liberty require only one additional rule,
namely, that the court should not admit evidence of religious inaccuracy or
implausibility and should primarily limit evidence to (1) incentives for
insincerity; (2) inconsistent behavior; and (3) consistency with beliefs of a
claimant’s religious beliefs.187 Thereafter, a specific jury instruction will
suffice. He observed that jurors are routinely instructed “to not allow their
biases or personal beliefs about this or that to interfere with their evaluation of the evidence. There is no reason to think that bias about the plausibility of a religious claim is especially hard to put aside when one evaluates
the claimant’s sincerity.”188 Indeed, citing a lack of direct evidence of a
jury’s religious bias and other evidence indicating a lack of jury bias in
general, he does not view bench trials as a superior alternative to his proposal.189 Although writing primarily in response to Hobby Lobby and in
181. See Horwitz, supra note 37, at 147.
182. See id. at 147.
183. See id. at 147– 50.
184. GREENAWALT, supra note 34, at 115– 16.
185. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise
of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 953– 54 (1989).
186. See Chapman, supra note 40, at 1189– 91.
187. See id. at 1231– 39.
188. Id. at 1208– 09.
189. See id. at 1230– 31.
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the context of religious accommodation, he is in favor of prosecuting religious fraud using a sincerity test on account of the cost of religious fraud,
which he describes as “obvious,” with the “religious charlatan [using]
something that many people place beyond value to bilk them of money,
time, and energy.”190
3.

Summary: Judge vs Jury

Underlying the debate as to the desirability of, and the appropriate
safeguards for, the use of a sincerity test in religious fraud prosecution is
the different assumptions as to how the factfinders actually go about the
fact-finding process. For supporters of Justice Jackson’s perspective noted
above, both judge and jury are so prone to religious bias that any adjudicating of religious fraud would be inflicted with their perceptions of what is
or should be legitimate religious teachings or practices. Such perceptions
are not static and may evolve to a broadly accommodating conceptualization in light of increased religious pluralism,191 but remain hostile to new
and unorthodox religious movements.
For scholars who advocate for deploying a sincerity test under additional procedural or substantive safeguards, a key assumption is the judge’s
ability to manage the risks of religious liberty violations. The proffered
proposals typically place the judge in an elevated position vis-à-vis the jury
in the fact-finding process, either through the right of the defendant to a
bench trial or greater scrutiny of the factual conclusions at the appellate
level. At the very least, the judge is tasked with the gatekeeper role in
ensuring the inquiry into a sincerity test is not distracted by the perceived
veracity of the claims, whether through crafting the appropriate jury
instructions or excluding prejudicial evidence.
Nathan Chapman’s optimism and confidence in the jury to faithfully
apply the sincerity test is notable for its rarity in the literature. Nonetheless, his reasoning is instructive for the purpose of this Article. A key justification for his position is that “jury bias is unproven,” especially in the
context of religious sincerity.192 Conversely, he supported his proposition
by alluding both to the empirical studies suggesting that juries are more
likely to find against the government in litigation on unconstitutional conduct and to the argument that inherent diversity of juries will likely result
in identification with a wide array of claimants.193
C.

Implications from the Hong Kong Case Study

The paucity of religious fraud prosecutions in the United States, especially when the alleged fraudulent claims are religious and mandate the
190. Id. at 1211– 12.
191. See EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, PROCLAIM LIBERTY THROUGHOUT ALL THE LAND 51 (2003).
Cf., Leo Preffer, supra note 147, at 25– 26 (arguing that marginalization occurs due to
tension with secular rather than theological concerns).
192. See Chapman, supra note 40, at 1230– 31.
193. See id. at 1230– 31.
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head-on application of a sincerity test,194 means that even anecdotal or
qualitative examination of the factual issues of religious bias in a sincerity
test have been precluded. This places this Hong Kong case study in a
unique position to contribute to the debate. First, Hong Kong has experienced a series of recent and regular religious fraud prosecutions under the
same criminal provision. This enables the close examination of how the
courts repeatedly deal with the identical legal requirement of falsity over a
set of similar fact patterns under comparable underlying socioeconomic
conditions. Second, the intermediate severity of the criminal provision
meant that the majority of the prosecutions took place as bench trials in
the District Court under Hong Kong criminal procedural laws.195 This
provides a set of judgments in which the judge is compelled to set out the
reasoning for the factual findings, which particularly sheds light on the
process by which the falsity of the religious fraudulent claims are
established.
As elaborated above in Part I.C, the actual approach adopted by the
Hong Kong courts revealed a common intrinsic suspicion of any claims
regarding luck-improving religious rituals that involve sexual acts. For
many judges, such a claim is not only incredulous on its face but also contrary to what religion ought to be. Admittedly, the defendants are typically
deemed by the judges as non-credible witnesses and may have committed
other acts such as procuring sex with threats or through force, such that
the defendants might have been convicted in any event under a properly
applied sincerity test. Nonetheless, the ostensible reliance of objective
assessment of religious veracity by the presiding professional judge (as
opposed to a jury), who is supposedly constrained by religious liberty prescriptions under constitutional, international human rights and common
law, does buttress the concerns expressed by Justice Jackson and his supporters. Trials of religious fraud would often be reduced to trials of religious heresy, both in substance and appearance. More pointedly, the Hong
Kong experience suggests that the often-proposed solution of bench trials
and other procedural safeguards that are premised on judges serving as
gatekeepers is likely of limited efficacy to restrain religious bias.
As an objection to this preceding argument, the United States is not
Hong Kong. Religious liberty is much more ingrained and respected by
both the judges and the public in the United States, such that the bias
witnessed in Hong Kong does not speak to the debate in the United States.
This is a potent argument to which this Article is highly sympathetic.
Indeed, the author has previously highlighted the glaring oblivion among
the legislators and the public with regard to formal religious discrimination
in the Hong Kong legal regime.196 Nonetheless, although the United States
194. Cf. United States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981); Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996).
195. See District Court Ordinance (1997) Cap. 336, §§ 74– 80, (H.K.).
196. See JIANLIN CHEN, THE LAW AND RELIGIOUS MARKET THEORY: CHINA, TAIWAN AND
HONG KONG 127– 34 (2017). Notably, there have been regular convictions of religious
fraudulent sex and religious frauds in Taiwan, a nearby East Asian jurisdiction, where
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as a whole may be much more vigilant in its considerations of religious
liberty, it is undeniable that there remain significant pockets within both
the general public and the legal professions that do not always appreciate
the demands arising from the First Amendment.197
Moreover, it is worth remembering that Hong Kong is not some backwater exotic jurisdiction; rather Hong Kong is a wealthy jurisdiction with a
per-capita annual GDP of around USD $44,000.198 Hong Kong is ranked
just a place below the United States in the most recent United Nation’s
Human Development Index.199 Its English common law legal system is
also well regarded by the international community, ranking sixteenth
worldwide in the 2016 Rule of Law index, above the United States, which is
eighteenth.200 At the very least, the experience of Hong Kong serves a cautionary reminder of the perils of assuming that religious liberty will be
readily extended by the judiciary to unpopular minority religions.
Additionally, the Hong Kong experience raises an implication that is
independent and immune on purported cultural differences. The U.S. discourse about the operation of a sincerity test in religious fraud prosecution
assumes that defendants would testify in court asserting the truth of their
religious claims. This would in turn generate what commentators regard
as the best evidence (in light of the probative value and risk of impermissible religious prejudice) for challenging sincerity, namely, defendants’ statements and testimonies.201 This is a reasonable assumption when the
alleged religious fraud in question is perpetuated by the leader of a purported religious organization— there, there would usually be copious
amounts of written materials detailing the religious claims such that there
might be a limited litigation advantage for the defendant to elect to remain
the courts similarly— and problematically— assume the falsity of the religious claims.
See Jianlin Chen, Joyous Buddha, Holy Father, and Dragon God Desiring Sex: A Case Study
of Rape by Religious Fraud in Taiwan, 13 NAT’L TAIWAN L. REV. (2018) (forthcoming);
Sheng-wei Tsai,
[Forcible Means in the Crime of Forced Sexual Intercourse], 18 ACADEMIA SINICA L.J. 41, 61– 64 (2016); Chun-Jin Tu & Po-Chiang
Liu,
[Does Sexual Intercourse Obtained by
Religious Deception Constitute Rape?], 58 MILITARY L.J. 50, 58– 62 (2012).
197. A notable recent example would be the travel restrictions issued by the Trump
Administration. While there is serious and important debate as to whether the actual
executive orders that target nationality without explicit mention of religion is constitutional, the president’s campaign rhetoric of banning Muslim immigrant does not adhere
to the principles of religious freedom. See Abed Ayoub & Khaled Beydoun, Executive
Disorder: the Muslim Ban, Emergency Advocacy, and the Fires Next Time, 22 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 215, 215 (2017); Joe Palazzolo, Travel Ban Ruling: Decision Raises Opposing Views,
WALL ST. J., June 27, 2017, at A4. Indeed, similar anti-Islam sentiment and corresponding discriminatory policy proposals have been frequently raised by Presidential candidates during the Republican primaries. See e.g., Marsha B. Freeman, Holier than You and
Me: “Religious Liberty” is the New Bully Pulpit and Its New Meaning is Endangering Our
Way of Life, 69 ARK. L. REV. 881, 892– 95 (2017).
198. See JAHAN, supra note 28, at 198.
199. Id.
200. See WORLD JUST. PROJECT, supra note 45, at 5.
201. See Horwitz, supra note 37, at 147– 50; Senn, supra note 38, at 342– 51.
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silent.202 In addition, defendants risk losing all their remaining adherents
if they are not prepared to defend their religious claims in court. However,
there remain scenarios in which defendants are under limited pressure to
testify or otherwise admit to making those religious statements, such as
when defendants are operating as individuals and/or primarily allude to
verbal representations of religious claims.203 Under such scenarios, as
revealed by this Hong Kong case study, the sincerity test is essentially
stone-walled and compels reliance on assumptions, whether implicit or
explicit, about what constitutes plausible religious claims.204
III.

Prosecuting Romantic Fraudulent Sex: Fraudulent Sex
Criminalization as Market Regulation

Part II engages with the religious fraud aspect of religious fraudulent
sex prosecutions. This dimension has thus far been absent from the academic discourse on fraudulent sex, notwithstanding the frequent mention
and discussion in U.S. law reviews on intriguing fraudulent sex cases in
other jurisdictions.205 The omission is understandable, given the lack of
awareness of such cases in even the Hong Kong and U.K. literature until
now. However, beyond adding to the already fascinating (or perverse?)
myriad of sexual deceptions206 and perhaps triggering a socio-legal
inquiry on the intersection between sex and religious practices,207 this
actual employment of a lesser fraudulent sex criminal offence to convict
arguably impossible-to-verify religious claims also allows a more concrete
footing on which to examine a persistent issue in the discourse of fraudulent sex, namely, the problem of sex procured by a false proclamation of
202. For example, the bulk of the alleged fraudulent representations in the Ballard
case are contained in literature distributed by the defendants. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at
79– 80.
203. See e.g., Hong Kong v. Ho Ka Po Tony, DCCC 1169/2012 (D.C. Apr. 29, 2013)
(Legal Reference System) (H.K.).
204. Paul Horwitz opined that in addition to the defendant’s testimony, evidence
relating to coexistence of relevant secular fraud and evidence of concealment could and
should be permitted in proving lack of sincerity. See Horwitz, supra note 37, at 147– 50.
However, the former would have established conventional fraud and thereby negated the
necessity for a sincerity test altogether. The latter is an option that is not particularly
common as per this Hong Kong case study. The only case in which there is arguably
evidence of concealment is the Ho Ka Po Tony case involving the foreign domestic helper,
which was also a relatively rare case where the victim was not made aware of involvement of sexual intercourse prior to meeting the defendant. See supra Part I.B.4.
205. Jed Rubenfeld begins his piece with the Israeli Kashour case. See Rubenfeld,
supra note 4, at 1375. See Gross, supra note 11, at 4– 15 (discussing gender impersonation cases from Israel and the U.K.). See generally Falk, supra note 49, at 48– 89 (discussing a wide survey of deceptive cases in the United States and around the world).
Notably, Patricia Falk mentioned an entertainment industry sex scam court case from
Hong Kong as garnered from the Lexis newspaper database. She notes that the convictions involved the “procurement” offence. Id. at 73– 74.
206. See e.g., DONIGER, supra note 4.
207. See e.g., Ludger H. Viefhues-Bailey, Holiness Sex: Conservative Christian Sex Practices as Acts of Sanctification, 6 J. MEN, MASCULINITIES & SPIRITUALITY 4 (2012); Janine
Anderson Sawada, Sexual Relations as Religious Practice in the Late Tokugawa Period:
Fujido, 32 J. JAPANESE STUD. 341 (2006).
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love. By demonstrating the legal possibility of successfully prosecuting
such romantic fraudulent sex under Section 120 and the ironically greater
justification for such prosecution, as compared to religious fraudulent sex,
this Part III highlights how fraudulent sex criminalization is also a regulation on the subject matter of the falsehood, be it religion, love, or other
forms of lies.
A.

Academic Debate on the Merits of Punishing Romantic Fraudulent
Sex

Romantic fraudulent sex is a staple in the academic literature on
fraudulent sex criminalization. It is frequently used as a rhetoric device to
highlight the logical conclusion posed by arguments in favor of broader
criminalization of deceptive sex, such as when Jed Rubenfeld observed that
“[i]f our criminal sex law were really designed to vindicate a right of sexual
autonomy, sex plus lies should equal jail time, whether the lie was a false
claim of bachelorhood, ‘I love you,’ or any other material misrepresentation
reasonably calculated to induce another person to have sex.”208 At the
same time, this purportedly radical and unpopular outcome has been rapidly countered by excluding this species of fraudulent sex from the proposal for broader criminalization of deceptive sex, such as when Gowri
Ramachandran argued that “we can also treat sexual partners as ‘on notice’
of certain common misrepresentations and exaggerations if we are worried
about people who are too eager to say ‘I love you,’ for instance.”209
Nonetheless, there has been a concerted engagement with the issue.
In a 2005 article published in the U.K., Jonathan Herring provocatively
argued that a false proclamation of “I love you” to get sex should be punished.210 He criticized the traditional reluctance to criminalize deception
in sexual relationships as being premised on the wrong starting point,
namely, that sexual intimacy is a good thing and criminalization is meant
to target sexual activities that are harmful. Instead, he advocated that the
law should determine what the acceptable forms of sexual intimacy are
and then criminalize the rest as harmful, with the tentative suggestion that
acceptable forms of sexual intimacy would involve elements of “reciprocity, integration, responsibility and mutuality.”211 This triggered a forceful
response from Hyman Gross, who observed that “words said to arouse feelings and to ‘put one in the mood’ are understood to be part of a game that
lovers play in which the propriety of what is said does not depend on its
truth”212 and that the law should not criminalize what are perceived to be
208. Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1410.
209. Ramachandrana, supra note 22, at 387.
210. See Herring, supra note 5, at 511. See also Alisdair A. Gillespie, The Electronic
Spanish Prisoner: Romance Frauds on the Internet, 81 J. CRIM. L. 217 (2017) (arguing that
such fraudulent sex would not be perceived or treated as rape by the public, and suggesting that it might be punished as a lesser procurement by false pretense offence that
is gender neutral).
211. Herring, supra note 5, at 515.
212. Gross, supra note 4, at 224.
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private moral failings without demonstrable harm to others.213 Michael
Bohlander joined the critique by noting that the “real harm” of such fraudulent sex is “[b]eing deceived and therefore humiliated”214 and bemoaned
the perceived “exaggerated political correctness” that underpins Jonathan
Herring’s proposal.215
Across the Atlantic in the United States, Stephen Schulhofer defended
the reluctance to criminalize sexual fraud where it relates to emotional
attraction and commitment (e.g., “I love you” and “I want to spend my life
with you”) on several grounds, including how the “especially difficult and
speculative” process to determine falsity, the indeterminate nature of the
harm, the backdoor revival of outdated regulation on sexual morality, and
“the elusive nature of ‘truth’ and the complex role of emotional imagination
in sexual encounters.”216 The last ground— a distinct problem from the
evidential difficulty that Stephen Schulhofer acknowledges is not insurmountable— is that “erotic experience, like storytelling in literature, so
often involves fantasy and the ‘willing suspension of disbelief.’ ”217 Building on Stephen Schulhofer’s work, David P. Bryden is similarly against
criminalizing lies about love (arguing for specific exemption for emotional
declaration in any legislative or judicial attempt to expand criminal liability for fraudulent sex) because of the massive intrusion into the private life
of an individual, the questionable and at least less severe harm of such
fraud, and evidential difficulties, both in terms of determining what the
facts are and the intrusive process of finding out the facts.218
B.

Prosecuting Romantic Fraudulent Sex through Section 120 and the
Crude Sincerity Test

It does appear that the general consensus even among proponents of
greater criminalization of fraudulent sex (e.g., Stephen Schulhofer argues
that misrepresentation as to the absence of sexually transmitted disease
should vitiate consent)219 is that romantic fraudulent sex should not be
penalized for two broad reasons: the evidential difficulties in determining
falsehood and the excessive and moralistic intervention in individuals’ private affairs. The merit of the latter rationale is beyond the scope of this
Article, but the former is particularly salient in light of this Article’s examination of how Section 120 has been used to prosecute religious fraud. The
evidential concerns of romantic fraudulent sex are similarly pertinent for
religious fraudulent sex. The truth of a representation as to the divine and
religious is as elusive, if not more so, than the truth of a proclamation of
love. Similarly, the indeterminate harm argument against criminalization
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
at 198

See id. at 226– 27.
Bohlander, supra note 2, at 416.
See id. at 412.
See SCHULHOFER, supra note 47, at 155– 58.
Id. at 158.
See Bryden, supra note 5, at 468– 70.
See SCHULHOFER, supra note 47, at 158– 59. See also WERTHEIMER, supra note 72,
(“Love, not just sex, may be deeply intertwined with false beliefs . . . .”).
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of romantic fraudulent sex (especially when compared to conventional
fraud involving property)220 is equally applicable to religious fraudulent
sex. The loss of the promised favorable divination would be impossible to
quantify or even be recognized.221 In this regard, it is also germane to
point out that discussion of romantic fraudulent sex criminalization often
revolves around the issue of rape. Although scholars recognize the possibility of pursuing such criminalization via a lesser criminal offence (such
as Section 120), the discussion of this possibility is only in passing, given
how such non-rape fraudulent sex provisions are either extremely rare
(United States)222 or abolished (U.K.)223 when the scholarly discussion
takes place.
This, in turn, means that the crude sincerity test employed by the
Hong Kong courts to overcome the evidential difficulty in establishing
religious falsehood can be equally applied to determine the veracity of
romantic representation, including the classic statement of “I love you.”
Through the purported use of a sincerity test to resolve the issue of falsehood, the court is implicitly (and correctly) acknowledging that trying to
determine what objectively constitutes “true” love is messy and unnecessary and that it is more effective and feasible to simply focus on assessing
whether the defendant is sincere when he/she made the proclamation of
love. This inquiry can be conducted by focusing on any inconsistencies
between the defendant’s purported definition of love and the defendant’s
actions and/or testimony. For example, if the defendant defines love as
having special care and concern for the person,224 his/her testimony
revealing he/she did not consider the welfare of the “victim” when he/she
made important decisions potentially affecting both parties could be used
against him/her. Alternatively, and equally likely, where the defendant has
elaborated to the victim the implications of his/her love (e.g., will marry
220. See Bryden, supra note 5, at 463– 64 (“we cannot presume causation [of harm
arising from romantic fraudulent sex], as we can in most serious financial scams”). See
also WERTHEIMER, supra note 72, at 202– 04 (discussing, critically, what are the possible
experiential and non-experiential harm arising from deceptive sex). Cf. DONIGER, supra
note 4, at 76– 87 (discussing via the literary perspective the grave humiliation and other
psychological and emotional harm that may arise from fraudulent sex while also recognizing the possibility of genuine pleasure).
221. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 94– 95 (Jackson, J. dissenting) (“The chief wrong which
false prophets do to their following is not financial . . . the real harm is on the mental
and spiritual plane. . . . When they are deluded and then disillusioned, cynicism and
confusion follow. The wrong of these things, as I see it, is not in the money the victims
part with half so much as in the mental and spiritual poison they get.”).
222. For a survey of state statutes dealing with fraudulent sex, see Falk, supra note 49,
at 107– 19.
223. Jonathan Herring did mention a prior offense of procuring sex by false pretenses
that was recently (at the time of his writing in 2005) abolished, but used the repeal to
double down on his proposal of criminalizing romantic fraudulent sex as rape. See Herring, supra note 5, at 522.
224. For a discussion of how the concept of love may be analytically separated into
the two dimensions of “attractive love” (which revolves around fulfillment of needs/
desires of self) and “virtuous love” (which focuses on benefiting the other), see Vincent
Jeffries, The Structure and Dynamics of Love: Towards a Theory of Marital Quality and
Stability, 27 HUMBOLDT J. SOC. REL. 42, 44– 47 (2002).
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him/her or will be in an exclusive relationship with him/her), the examination of sincerity can either be shifted to whether the defendant intended to
uphold those promises225 or adopted those implications as the purported
defendant’s definition of love.
This attempt to find contradictions may not be applicable if the defendant elected not to give evidence. But as with the religious fraud case, the
court can still apply certain assumptions to find that the proclamation of
love in certain contexts is prima facie false. Examples include when the
defendant has simultaneously engaged in multiple sexual or romantic relationships with other people or when the defendant is verbally or physically
abusive to the victim.226 Notably, for the later example, testimonial evidence by the victim on the verbal and physical abuses levied at him/her
will suffice for the fact-finding process.
Admittedly, there is a significant difference between how the crude
sincerity test is applied to romantic fraud. For religious fraudulent sex, the
court is at times essentially treating certain representations on religious
matters (here being that sex is part of religious ritual) as per se false. However, for romantic fraudulent sex, additional evidence of the defendant’s
conduct or words are necessary to establish falsity of the proclamation of
love. The main reason for this departure is because love is a widelyaccepted rationale for sexual activity, such that procuring sex on the pretext of love is itself an utterly plausible premise, and the question is
whether the premise is factually true (i.e., whether the defendant actually
did love the victim). On the other hand, performance of a luck-improving
religious ritual is a much more unconventional reason to have sex (at least
as perceived by the judges), so as to trigger a wholesale rejection of the
premise (i.e., there is no such religious ritual as a matter of fact). As be will
elaborated in the next section, this distinction is precisely one of the reasons that prosecuting romantic fraudulent sex is more justified than religious fraudulent sex.
C.

Romantic Fraudulent Sex versus Religious Fraudulent Sex

The previous section explains how Section 120, together with the
crude sincerity test applied by the courts, could be employed to prosecute
romantic fraudulent sex. There are no such prosecutions, as compared to
numerous prosecutions of religious fraudulent sex, whether in terms of
225. The provision explicitly stipulates that the relevant representation could include
“representation as to the intention of the person.” Crimes Ordinance, supra note 16,
§ 120(2).
226. In an ethnological survey of the concept of love in the U.S. and Russia, it was
found that three characteristics of altruism, intrusive thinking (always thinking) and
supreme happiness resonate strongly for both genders in both jurisdictions. See Victor
de Munck, Andrey Korotayev & Darya Khaltourina, A Comparative Study of the Structure
of Love in U.S. and Russia: Finding a Common Core of Characteristics and National Gender
Differences, 48 ETHNOLOGY 337, 354 (2009). See also Harry T. Reis & Arthur Aron, Love:
What is it, Why Does it Matter, and How Does it Operate?, 3 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 80,
82 (2008) (discussing psychological research that find trust and caring as “highly prototypical of love”).
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absolute number or in proportion to the overall use of Section 120.
Although this Article is not suggesting that Section 120 should be used to
prosecute romantic fraudulent sex, it is important to note that it is ironically more justified to prosecute romantic fraudulent sex when compared
to religious fraudulent sex. The reasons are twofold.
First, as explained in Part II, the courts are constitutionally prohibited
from making determinations as to what constitutes true religion. Even if
the sincerity test may arguably pass constitutional muster, there remains
normative concerns about how its application would likely introduce religious bias against an unpopular minority faith. The legal and normative
considerations are substantially less salient for romance. It is often
acknowledged that as a normative matter, the state should largely stay
away from the private affairs of individuals, no less matters of the heart.227
Courts in the United States have expansively interpreted (created?) the constitutional right of substantive due process to constraint state regulations
on marriage, sex-related activities (e.g., contraception or abortion), and
sexual activities (e.g., prohibition of sodomy).228 Nonetheless, it is still
common to find state intervention in the realm of sex, marriage, and family, even among purportedly liberal societies.229 More importantly, there
is no per se prohibition against the state defining and determining what
love is. In this regard, it is interesting to observe that the Hong Kong courts
have been quite comfortable in discussing love, from opining whether the
defendant had any love or affection toward the victim230 to direct engagement of what “genuine love” is.231
227. See Gross, supra note 4, at 225– 27; SCHULHOFER, supra note 47, at 155– 58.
228. In the U.S., of particular relevance is the right of intimate association. See Nancy
Catherine Marcus, The Freedom of Intimate Association in the Twenty First Century, 16
GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 269, 317– 28 (2006); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of
Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 626– 29 (1980).
229. Such state intervention usually takes the forms of active advocacy, subsidy and/
or legal support for the particular family arrangement consisting of marriage with children. See Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865, 878– 89
(1989) (discussing how regulations on family have simultaneously been reduced for
certain aspects, such as those relating to morality and reproduction, while increasing in
others, such as those issues involving minors). See also Letter from Dayna K. Shah,
Assoc. Gen. Counsel., U.S. Gen. Accounting Off., to Hon. Bill First, Majority Leader, U.S.
Senate (Jan. 23, 2004) (observing that are easily over 1000 “federal statutory provisions
. . . in which marital status is a factor in determining or receiving benefits, rights, and
privileges”), available at https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5WCX-C4TS].
230. See e.g., Hong Kong v. Tang Tin-yau, DCCC388/2016, ¶ 30 (D.C. Nov. 28, 2016)
(Legal Reference System) (H.K.) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that he loves the victim,
and considering it as “one-sided invented feelings” on account of the age difference
between the 63 year old defendant and 12 year old victim); Hong Kong v. Tang Takcheung, HCCC 208/2013 (C.F.I. Sept. 17, 2013) (Legal Reference System) (H.K.) (opining that “[i]t can hardly be said that the defendant had any love and affection towards
any of the girls” in a plead guilty case involving defendant posing as a female doctor
online to get nude photos of underage victims before using those photos to pressure sex
on the victims).
231. See e.g., Hong Kong v. Tong Yip-Chung, DCCC 755/2013 (D.C. Oct. 9, 2013)
(opining that “[L]ove can be blind, and love can become hate, but love does not equate to
possessing the other party, or requiring to love you more. Real love is about how one
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The second reason why prosecution of romantic fraudulent sex is
more justified than religious fraudulent sex is that love is a much more
widely accepted reason for sexual activities than is religion, whether perceived as such by the general public or in terms of state policy. Indeed,
whereas prostitution has been decriminalized in many jurisdictions,232
courts are still extremely reluctant to enforce contracts, agreements, and
promises whereby the consideration is sexual on the grounds that use of
sex as a commodity contravenes public policy.233 Indeed, where such a
contract/agreement/promise is enforced by the courts or recognized by
statute, it is in the context of “seduction” in which the promise is restricted
to the promise of marriage.234 Thus, even if the legal doctrines surrounding seduction are arguably rightly abolished as being premised on outdated notions of gender and sexual norms235 and that the state is slow to
intervene on matters of pure sexual morality,236 it will still be a stretch to
argue that sex for love is on the same normative footing as the other forms
of sex, especially when the sex is conducted as part of religious ritual to
obtain advantageous divine intervention for the immediate problems of the
participant.
Another way to appreciate the differences in normative positions
between romantic sex and religious sex is vis-à-vis the common argument
proffered when defending the limited criminalization of fraudulent sex:
namely, the victim could have adopted an appropriate level of skepticism
and engaged in the conduct at their own risk.237 The consequence of such
an approach is reduced activity, as it does when the prevalence of counterfeit goods negatively impacts commercial markets.238 This consequence
cares for the other, for the good of the other, and not hurt the other”). See Kevin Kwokyin Cheng, Moral Discourse in Hong Kong’s Chinese Criminal Proceedings, 3 CHINESE J.
COMP. L. 375, 383– 88 (2015) (discussing how lower court judges in Hong Kong often
employed moral discourse to lecture both the defendant and the public about the judges’
opinions of morality).
232. See Victoria Nagy & Anastasia Powell, Legalising Sex Work: The Regulation of
‘Risk’ in Australian Prostitution Law Reform, 28 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 1, 5– 6 (2016)
(discussing the regulation of sex work in Australia); see also Suzanne Bouclin, Regulating
Sex Work in Canada, 2012 PUB. L. 387, 388– 91 (2012) (discussing the legal and political
landscape in Canada vis-à-vis sex work regulation).
233. For the U.K., see GUENTER TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 443– 44 (11th ed.
2003). For the U.S., see Andrew Gilden, Sexual (Re)consideration: Adult Entertainment
Contracts and the Problem of Enforceability, 95 GEO. L.J. 541, 557– 60 (2007).
234. See Falk, supra note 49, at 116– 18. See FREEDMAN, supra note 46, at 33– 51 (discussing the historical and social context of the crime of seduction in the U.S.). See also
H.W. Humble, Seduction as a Crime, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 144 (1921) (an early twentieth
century journal article discussing the then trend of criminalizing seduction and finding
such a trend not objectionable).
235. Hong Kong previously recognized the right to bring a civil suit for breach of
promise of marriage, but this cause of action was legislatively repealed in 1971. See
Wang Xi v. Lee Pok Hok Andrew, [2011] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 1134, 1140 (C.A.) (H.K.).
236. See Hafen, supra note 229, at 878– 81.
237. See McJunkin, supra note 22, at 21– 25 (discussing the prevalence of this argument but critical thereof).
238. See Trang Huyen My Pham & Muhammad Ali Nasir, Conspicuous Consumption,
Luxury Products and Counterfeit Market in the UK, 13 EUROPEAN J. APPLIED ECON. 72,
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may well be accepted or tolerated as a matter of principle, as implicitly
recognized by proponents of this argument. Yet, it will be rather peculiar if
the state is less concerned about decreased engagement of sexual activities
in pursuit of love compared to the decreased engagement of sexual activities for luck-improvement religious rituals.
D.

Fraudulent Sex Criminalization as Fraud Regulation

To be clear, this Article is not arguing that romantic fraudulent sex
should be prosecuted. Rather, the critical comparison in the previous section serves two purposes.
First is to argue that the religious fraudulent cases should not have
been prosecuted in the first place. This Article does not take a position as
to whether the broadly worded Section 120 should be retained beyond
observing that the abolishment in the U.K. has been frequently criticized
by English academics together with suggestions that it should be reenacted239 and that the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission has similarly
recommend retention of the provision.240 However, notwithstanding the
confidence of academics that prosecutorial discretion will prevent abusive
and otherwise undesirable use of such a broadly worded provision,241 the
employment of the provision to tackle religious fraudulent sex in Hong
Kong has proven to be normatively problematic. Not only does the prosecution compel courts to inadvertently step into the objective determination
of what constitutes legitimate/true religious practices, but the prosecutions
are also aimed at victims’ activities (i.e., sex to obtain favorable divine intervention) to which the state is at best indifferent to. That none of the cases
(save perhaps the case involving a foreign domestic helper) involve abuses
of fiduciary relationship— religious or otherwise— by the defendant further
diminishes the justification for such prosecutions.242
73– 76 (2016); Thorsten Staake et al., Business Strategies in the Counterfeit Market, 65 J.
BUS. RES. 658, 658 (2012).
239. See Laird, supra note 10, at 509; Simpson, supra note 23, at 110; Spencer, supra
note 7, at 8. See also Temkin & Ashworth, supra note 77, at 345– 46 (arguing the value of
the abolished provision as a sort of “middle way” between complete acquittal and severe
sanctions).
240. See LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF HONG KONG, supra note 78, at 68.
241. See Spencer, supra note 7, at 8. See also Susan Leahy, “No Means No”, But
Where’s the Force? Addressing the Challenges of Formally Recognizing Non-violent Sexual
Coercion as a Serious Criminal Offence, 78 J. CRIM. L. 309, 323– 24 (2014) (arguing for
prosecutorial discretion to ensure the reintroduction of the offence of procuring sex by
threat will not result in over-criminalization). Cf., Alexandra Brodsky, “Rape-Adjacent”:
Imagining Legal Responses to Nonconsensual Condom Removal, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
183, 194– 95 (2017) (referring to Israeli cases where fraudulent sex involving deception
as to ethnicity and gender was successfully prosecuted and observing that “[t]oo often,
courts use rape by deception to validate and operationalize bigotry”).
242. See Green, supra note 23, at 226– 27 (arguing that in the context of sex under
fraudulent pretense of medical treatment, the presence of a fiduciary relationship
increases the wrongfulness of the act, though suggesting that the act could be punished
under sexual offences involving abuse of position of trust). See also Zanita E. Fenton,
Faith in Justice: Fiduciaries, Malpractice & Sexual Abuse by Clergy, 8 MICH. J. GENDER &
L. 45, 58– 68 (2001) (discussing the problems of sexual misconduct/abuse by clergy and
arguing that the relationship of trust and confidence warrants imposition of breach of
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Second, and more importantly for this Article, the critical comparison
with romantic fraudulent sex highlights that criminalization of fraudulent
sex is— beyond the traditional lens of sexual offences that have been the
focus of existing literature— also a form of fraud regulation.
When discussing whether fraudulent sex should be criminalized, academics tend to focus on how the law impacts sexual relationships and sexual activity243 or, relatedly, sexual autonomy.244 Other scholars, given the
intimate association between romance and sex,245 have gone further and
debate on the collateral consequences of romantic relationships. Jed
Rubenfeld and others are worried about the stifling of romance and love
under broad criminalization of deceptive sex,246 whereas Ben A. McJunkin
argues that arguments in favor of limiting the scope of criminalized fraudulent sex are underpinned by a conception of seduction as something of
widespread practice (thus implicitly rather innocuous) or even a social
good (as intrinsic to romance).247 Indeed, Alan Wertheimer identified
how “sexual relationships” could be conceived as one of the four possible
relationship models of a competitive game, contractual interaction, friendship, or fiduciary, with the empirical determination and/or normative
choice of the model having corresponding implications for how law should
treat deceptive sex.248
Such an inquiry focus is without a doubt understandable, necessary,
and desirable. Sexual activities have always been an intrinsically special
aspect of human life, with deep and extensive implications on gender and
social ordering.249 Rape law reform has also been a prominent and confiduciary duty, especially since “sexual activity, and especially misconduct, are not
products of religious beliefs [of traditional major religions in society today]”); Janice D.
Villers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability for Sexual Misconduct in the Counseling
Relationship, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 37– 48 (1996) (highlighting the power imbalance
between clergy counselors and parishioners that is accentuated by divine salvation and
arguing that the relationship is fiduciary in nature and thus gives rise to corresponding
liability for sexual misconduct).
243. See FREEDMAN, supra note 46, at 33– 51; Herring, supra note 5, at 523– 24.
244. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1417– 22; Yung, supra note 2, at 27– 35.
245. Psychological research has suggested there is some correlation of attitudes
towards love to certain forms of sexual styles. See Kurt Frey & Mahzad Hojjat, Are Love
Styles Related to Sexual Styles?, 35 J. SEX RES. 265, 269– 71 (1998). See also DONIGER,
supra note 4, at 63– 66 (observing that while a linguistic and conceptual distinction is
typically drawn between “love” and “lust” in many cultures, there is much ambiguity
between the perceived boundary and causal relationship between the two).
246. See Bryden, supra note 5, at 462 (“the argument that deception in love is pervasive and perhaps essential to romance”); Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1416 (“And love? A
vast engine of deception. Even in a hook-up culture, love floats on the horizon, an
obscure object of desire, and what is more common than love’s blinding one person to
the most basic facts about another?”).
247. See McJunkin, supra note 22, at 21– 25. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 69– 71
(1987) (observing how the broad conception of permissible “seduction” in rape law is
without parallel when compared to other areas of criminal law).
248. For example, the competitive model will permit much more deception as compared to the other models. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 72, at 210– 13.
249. See generally JAMES BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL
EUROPE (1987); see also JEFFREY WEEKS, SEX, POLITICS & SOCIETY: THE REGULATIONS OF
SEXUALITY SINCE 1800 3– 6, 11– 12 (John Stevenson ed., 2d ed. 2014).
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tentious focal point for scholars, lawmakers, and advocates in the broader
feminist challenges to outdated and sexist sexual norms.250 It is thus no
surprise that much of the discourse on fraudulent sex has been examined
through the twin lenses of criminal law intervention in a sexual relationship. Indeed, attempts to make distinctions within the vast array of possible fraudulent sex remain rooted in the vantage point of sex. There is
recognition as to how fraudulent representations may differ as to its nature
and effect on the harm and corresponding justification for criminalization.251 For example, the false representation that one is a movie agent to
procure sex on the promise of offering a movie role arguably results in
pecuniary harm rather than a violation of sexual autonomy.252 This, in
turn, supports criminalization of some form of more objectionable fraud
(e.g., sexually transmitted disease253 or sexual protection254) while not
intervening in others.255
Without diminishing the significance of this inquiry, the critical comparison between romantic and religious fraudulent sex in this Article
revealed another important dimension that warrants consideration. The
subject matter of the representations utilized by the fraudsters have distinct
legal and normative implications beyond the impact on sexual autonomy
and relationships. Prosecuting religious fraudulent sex is as much about
policing sex as it is about regulating religion. The transactional nature of
the religious claims employed in these Hong Kong cases means that the
nature of the fraud (i.e., purpose or inducement) and the harm suffered by
the victim (i.e., loss of the promised benefits) is akin to the scenario of the
false promise by a purported movie agent (and arguably identical in the Au
Yeung Kwok Fu case, in which the victim is looking for divine intervention
250. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1090, 1137– 61 (1986); Aya Gruber,
Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 586– 603 (2009).
251. A point of debate between Michael Bohlander, Hyman Gross and Jonathan Herring is that what exactly is the harm of romantic fraudulent sex as compared to fraudulent sex where the fraud goes to the nature of the act. See Bohlander, supra note 2, at
416; Gross, supra note 4, at 224– 25; see also Green, supra note 23, at 219– 24 (arguing
for a gradated approach towards sexual offences whereby not all nonconsensual sexual
intercourse are morally or legally equivalent, and that criminalization and punishment
of fraudulent sex should reflect the differing degree of harm posed by different forms of
deceptions).
252. See Bryden, supra note 5, at 466– 67. See also WERTHEIMER, supra note 72, at
207– 09 (making a distinction between the victim treating sex “as a cost for which she
expects to receive a greater benefit” and “as an activity in which she would like to engage
or as part of a valued relationship”).
253. See Rubenfeld, supra note 4, at 1416– 17; SCHULHOFER, supra note 47, at 158– 59.
See also Shaffer, supra note 8 (examining, critically, the Canadian Supreme Court jurisprudence whereby deception about sexually transmitted diseases may vitiate consent if
it poses a significant risk of bodily harm).
254. See Katsampes, supra note 9, at 172– 82. See Brodsky, supra note 241, at 208– 10
(arguing for the creation of a tort for such deception).
255. See also Chiesa, supra note 22, at 452– 58 (arguing that coercion should be the
touchstone for determining whether deceptive sex should be criminalized as rape); Williams, supra note 23, at 157– 58 (arguing that sexual fraud as to legal characteristics may
be punished as a distinct category, and observing how “such a category would support
the protection given to such institutions elsewhere in law”).
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to improve her modeling career).256 Nonetheless, the prosecutions in this
case study can and should also be conceived as a general clamp down on
perceived pseudo-religious and superstitious activities,257 with all the consequential normative and legal complications.
The immediate significance from this new conceptualization of fraudulent sex criminalization is that it provides a justification for selective
criminalization of fraudulent sex on the basis of the normative desirability
in policing certain forms of representations. The fraud in the inducement
and the fraud in the factum distinction under the traditional common law
approach toward fraudulent sex258 have resulted in hugely controversial
acquittals of perceived morally repressible defendants, such as the notorious U.S. case Boro v. Superior Court.259 The corresponding public outcry
has in turn spurred legislative responses that specifically criminalize the
representation employed in the respective cases. As observed by Patricia
Falk, “Boro and Broderson prompted statutory innovation in medical contexts, Leiding preceded its state’s psychotherapist legislation, and Dutton
antedated specific clergy provisions.”260 The same pattern is repeated elsewhere. In Australia, the states of Victoria and New South Wales have
enacted specific provisions to address rape fraud involving medical purposes and marital status (between the perpetuator and victim) in direct
response to controversial acquittals by the courts.261
These selective criminalization on the basis of the subject matter of the
fraudulent criminalization has attracted criticism. Simon H. Bronitt
argued that “[m]erely devising piecemeal statutory modifications on an ad
hoc basis . . . tackles the symptoms rather than the cause of the problem,”
namely, the restrictive view under common law that focuses only on fraud
relating to the physical mechanics of the acts.262 Similarly, Patricia Falk
contends that the “major shortcoming [of these legislative enactments] lie
in their very specificity.”263 By only covering conducts within the specific
context stipulated in the provision, potential victims are unprotected from
otherwise similar conduct that does not fall under the provision.264
However, from the perspective of fraud regulation, such selective
criminalization is common and justified. Whereas fraud typically attracts
moral condemnation, legal responses to fraud do vary in accordance with
the representation employed in the deception. A good illustrative example
would be fraudulent representations in the sale of food products. A whole
256. See supra Part I.B.1.
257. This is arguably the case given the presence of other discriminatory laws and
policies in Hong Kong that target Chinese folk religions. See infra nn.311– 319 and
accompanying text.
258. See supra Part I.B.3.
259. Cal. Rptr. at 122.
260. Falk, supra note 49, at 65.
261. See Bronitt, supra note 49, at 296– 98; see also SIMON BRONITT & BERNADETTE
MCSHERRY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 680– 81 (4th ed. 2017).
262. Bronitt, supra note 49, at 296– 98.
263. Falk, supra note 49, at 101.
264. See id.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-3\CIN301.txt

2018

Lying About God

unknown

Seq: 47

28-JAN-19

10:14

599

variety of lies are possible. In addition to deceptive sales practices associated with any commercial transaction, there could be disinformation on
any of the characteristics of the food product itself, ranging from brand,
quantity, ingredient (including the use of artificial additives), nutritional
value, geographical origin, farming practices, therapeutic properties, religious certification, and so on.265 Although the legal prohibition on misinformation of all these different characteristics can and should be properly
categorized and approached as a form of food regulation, it is also apparent
that each characteristic may have unique normative considerations (e.g.,
intellectual property, unfair competition, public health, agricultural policy,
or religious freedom)266 and thus often have their own distinct legal
regimes with differing levels of state supervision and punishments.267
The same is applicable to fraudulent sex. Given how the medical profession has been heavily regulated in the modern state,268 the specific legislative provision on fraudulent sex in the medical context could— in
addition to the usual criminal law concerns about abuse of power and protection of vulnerable victims269— be treated as an extension of the regulation of the medical profession.270 In the same vein, the Australian
statutory amendment that renders deception of marital status between the
perpetuator and the victim (i.e., whether the perpetuator and the victim are
in fact legally married) as capable of vitiating consent271 is in line with
long-standing state interventions of requiring and facilitating public disclosure of marital status in a bid to protect the institution of marriage.272
To be clear, the argument here is not that criminalization of fraudulent
sex should always be conducted in a piecemeal fashion on the basis of the
subject matter of the representation. This new conceptualization of fraud
265. See generally NEAL D. FORTIN, FOOD REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, POLICY, AND PRAC(2d ed. 2017).
266. See e.g., Abigail A. Carson, Something’s Fishy: Combatting Seafood Fraud and Mislabeling in South Carolina, 68 S.C. L. REV. 973, 981– 83 (2017) (identifying the economic,
health and environmental harm associated with deceptive labelling of seafood); see also
Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: the Spirited Debate about Geographical
Indications, 58 Hastings L.J. 299, 339, 343– 51 (2006) (unpacking the considerations of
trademark, monopoly rent and agricultural subsidies that underpins the debate over
regulation/protection of geographical indications); Rosenthal, supra note 178, at 956– 59
(1997) (discussing the Establishment Clause considerations in regulations so as to
tackle Kosher fraud).
267. For an overview of the different types of possible food fraud and the corresponding regulatory regime, see FORTIN, supra note 265.
268. See Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice, 8
ANNALS HEALTH L. 201, 202– 23 (1999); Leland, supra note 52, at 1329, 1342.
269. See Green, supra note 23, at 225– 27.
270. See also Anne C. Dailey, The Psychodynamics of Sexual Choice, 57 ARIZ. L. REV.
343, 358– 71 (2015) (discussing the justifications for restricting sexual relationships
between therapist and patient from the psychoanalytical perspective).
271. Crimes Act 1900 No 40 (NSW) § 61HA sub-div 5 (Austl.) (“A person who consents to sexual intercourse with another person: . . . under a mistaken belief that the
other person is married to the person . . . does not consent to the sexual intercourse.”).
272. See Teri Dobbins Baxter, Marriage on Our Own Terms, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 1, 11– 20 (2017) (discussing the various legal regulations of marriage prerequisites, roles, and obligations).
TICE
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regulation is meant to add to, rather than substitute, the existing inquiry
from the perspective of sexual offences. There are many legitimate countervailing reasons— such as to ensure adequate protection of potential victims273 or to punish morally culpable conduct274— to approach legal
reform of fraudulent sex criminalization in a holistic and comprehensive
manner. Rather, the central thrust of this new conception is to highlight
the necessity and desirability of being actively aware of the disparate legal
and normative considerations associated with, in particular, the subject
matter of the false representation, whether in any legal reform on fraudulent sex criminalization275 or, as per this case study, the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in enforcing broadly-worded fraudulent sex
provisions.
IV.

Fraud and Market

This Article’s recognition that prosecution of fraudulent sex is also a
regulation of the premise or context used in the fraud is in line with recent
attempts to move the discourse on general rape law beyond the confines of
criminal law. For example, given the limited success of criminal law in
light of the high burden of proof, conflicting notions of what constitutes a
rapist, and complicated reluctance on the part of victim, Kathrine Baker
proposes the use of Title IX enforcements by the Department of Education
to reduce the amount of nonconsensual sex on campus and thereby change
the norm of male entitlement.276 Margo Kaplan argues for an alternative
public health framework to more holistically tackle the multifarious causes
of sexual violence and coercion.277 In a similar vein, the conceptualization
of fraudulent sex criminalization as fraud regulation will also introduce
new normative considerations that are independent from existing inquiry
into the sexual dimension. Such recognition will facilitate co-opting the
rich literature that utilizes economic perspectives to examine the impact of
fraud, and the corresponding legal responses, on people’s behaviors.
This part of the Article discusses the relevant economic literature that
has critically analyzed how the cost of state intervention may outweigh the
benefit and highlights the unintended and counterproductive consequences that may arise from Hong Kong’s prosecutions of religious fraudulent sex.
273. See Falk, supra note 49, at 101.
274. See Dripps, supra note 2, at 1780 (While specifically skeptical about criminalizing fraudulent sex, Dripps argued that rape law should be replaced by a selection of
statutory offences that specifically and differentially targets the relevant culpable
conduct.).
275. Cf. Villers, supra note 242, at 32– 37 (arguing that the problem of clergy’s sexual
misconduct should be primarily addressed by legislature through specific provisions
that are narrowly tailored to the culpable conduct— here being the use of clergy’s position and influence to take advantage of vulnerable women— while taking scrupulous
care to address any religious liberty concerns).
276. See Baker, supra note 50, at 223– 25.
277. See Kaplan, supra note 50, at 1048– 51.
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Fraud, Market, and Regulation

Fraud is as old as civilization, attracting all forms of sanctions since
ancient times278 while remaining a persistent problem all over the
globe.279 The modern legal system typically contains a whole host of measures to tackle the bane of fraud, ranging from severe criminal sanctions
against the perpetuator280 to generous civil remedies for the victims.281
This is often complemented with a variety of statutes and regulations
designed to reduce the incidence of fraud in commercial context282 and
even personal matters such as marriage.283
This proliferation is unsurprising given how fraud is commonly
regarded as immoral,284 notwithstanding that scholars have increasingly
argued that from a consequentialist perspective, there will be numerous
circumstances in which the benefits of deception can be sufficiently large
to render the fraud morally justified.285 Examples include deceptions used
to facilitate investigation by journalists and law enforcement officers,286 to
prevent improper use of information that is explicitly designated as under
no obligation of disclosure (e.g., religion or race in job application),287 and
to help the oppressed (e.g., Nazis, slave-owners) overcome their
278. See LEVINE, supra note 3, at 53; Biscotti, supra note 3, at 2– 10.
279. See Valentin-Stelian Badescu, Fraud in Electronic Commerce, 2 PERSP. BUS. L.J. 8, 9
(2013); Jeff Langenderfer & Terence A. Shimp, Consumer Vulnerability to Scams, Swindles, and Fraud: A New Theory of Visceral Influences on Persuasion, 18 PSYCHOLOGY &
MARKETING 763, 763 (2001).
280. See Theft Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 210, §§ 17– 19 (H.K.); Fraud Act, 2006, c. 35
(U.K.). See also Bryan H. Druzin & Jessica Li, The Criminalization of Lying: Under What
Circumstances, if any, Should Lies be Made Criminal, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529,
545– 50 (2011) (discussing the various ways criminal law punishes lies).
281. Damages for fraudulent misrepresentation include all actual damage directly
flowing from the fraudulent inducement without much limitation as to remoteness or
foreseeability, unlike in the case for negligent misrepresentation where damages are so
limited. See Smith New Court Securities Ltd. v. Citibank N.A., [1997] AC 254 (HL)
266– 67, 269 (U.K.). There may also be statutory provisions for exemplary damages for
defendants who successfully resist fraudulent litigation claims. See Julian Fulbrook, Tasneem v. Morley, 2014 J. PERSONAL INJURY L. 91, 92– 95 (2014).
282. See also Will Barnett, Fraud Enforcement in the Financial Services Act 1986: an
Analysis and Discussion of s.47, 17 COMPANY LAWYER 203, 204 (1996) (discussing the
historical backdrop of the enactment of the Financial Services Act in the U.K. and the
underlying purpose of preventing financial fraud).
283. The institution of a public register of marriage and the requirement for a period
of public notice prior to marriage. See Marriage Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 181, §§ 6– 10,
23– 26 (H.K.).
284. See Ariel Porat & Omri Yadlin, A Welfarist Perspectives on Lies, 91 IND. L.J. 617,
623– 24 (2016) (observing the disparate legal treatment of non-disclosure and lies, and
noting the deontological morality underpinning the distinction).
285. See Druzin & Li, supra note 280, at 532– 38 (discussing the strict deontological
critique of all lies as inherently wrong and the consequentialist more circumstantial
objection to deceit).
286. See Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First
Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1471– 80 (2015) (arguing that such deceptions promote First Amendment values of truth, individual autonomy, and democratic selfgovernance).
287. See Porat & Yadlin, supra note 284, at 634– 38.
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oppressors.288
Beyond its effects on morality, fraud also has disruptive effects on the
proper conduct of human activities. This has been recognized and discussed in traditional legal literature. For example, a common argument for
regulation of charities is that if the public perceives rampant fraudulent
practices by purported charitable organizations, there would be a paralyzing distrust that would curtail charitable donations.289 In the context
of fraudulent sex, it is similarly recognized that one consequence of noncriminalization is that women would be more cautious and hesitant to
engage in sexual activity.290
In this regard, scholarship informed by economic perspectives can further elaborate the nuances and flesh out the sometimes counterintuitive
dynamics among fraud, law, and the market. For example, fraud not only
poses direct harm to the deceived but can also dilute the ability of honest
merchants or individuals from conveying truthful information.291 Coupled with the difficulty in observing and verifying the relevant information,
this can lead to the so-called lemons market, whereby the market will
degenerate with fraudsters driving out legitimate operators due to the
inability of consumers to differentiate between the two.292 More pertinent
are the insights as to appropriate legal responses. The basic starting point
is that policing and regulation can be costly and outweigh the benefit of
reduction in fraud, especially where the fraud is hard to detect.293 Yet,
there also could be complications in which increased policing or regulations to combat fraud can ironically increase the incidence of fraud. For
example, increased regulations may dilute the trust relationship between
parties in an existing relationship (e.g., insurer and insured in insurance
claims fraud) such that it reduces moral or emotional inhibition to commit
fraud.294 Increased policing may also give potential victims a false sense of
288. See R. George Wright, Lying and Freedom of Speech, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1131,
1148– 58 (2011) (arguing that lying may advance autonomy, truth, dignity, equality and
other desired values in these contexts).
289. See Joseph Mead, Confidence in the Nonprofit Sector Through Sarbanes-Oxley-Style
Reforms, 106 MICH. L. REV. 881, 884– 86 (2008); Yolanda Demianczuk, Charity Regulation in the Russian Federation, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 477, 482– 84 (1997).
290. See Herring, supra note 5, at 520– 21; Bryden, supra note 5, at 461.
291. See Porat & Yadlin, supra note 284, at 631– 34. See also Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 630– 31 (1992)
(discussing the three type of social costs— increased victims’ precaution costs, deadweight investment in deception, and allocative costs— imposed by fraud).
292. See Brian Roe & Ian Sheldon, Credence Good Labeling: The Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Several Policy Approaches, 89 AM. J. OF AGRI. ECON. 1020, 1021
(2007); Anke S. Kessler, Revisiting the Lemons Market, 42 INT’L. ECON. REV. 25, 25– 27
(2001).
293. See Diana Crumley, Achieving Optimal Deterrence in Food Safety Regulation, 31
REV. LITIG. 353, 366– 68 (2012); David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market
Change, Social Norms, and the Trust “Reposed in the Workman,” 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531,
539– 40 (2001).
294. See Sharon Tennyson, Moral, Social, and Economic Dimensions of Insurance Claims
Fraud, 75 SOC. RES. 1181, 1182 (2008).
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security so that they do not undertake cost-effective precautions.295
B.

Credence Goods and State Intervention

For the purpose of this Article, a particularly interesting and relevant
contribution of the economic literature relates to the market involving
credence goods. Credence goods is an economic concept for goods and
services whose quality cannot be judged whether before or after consumption, thus elevating the supplier’s credibility as a particularly salient consideration in the calculus of consumers.296 Typical examples include
medical treatment, legal services, and automobile repairs. Given the severe
information asymmetry for consumers, a whole host of government interventions ranging from licensing and certification to expanding sellers’ liability have been advocated to protect consumers and ensure proper
functioning of the market.297
Religion, given its allusion to divinity, the spiritual realm, the afterlife,
and other effectively unverifiable concerns, is the ultimate credence good
in which the inability of adherents to assess the true quality of the “product” is not simply due to lack of information or expertise, but also due to
the fact that there is no objective way to verify the core claims of religious
truth.298 This challenges the key assumption of state intervention for more
conventional credence goods, namely, that the state is in a better position
to evaluate the otherwise elusive qualities of the product/service through
employing economies of scale in information and expertise. In such circumstances, state intervention in religious matters can have unintended
and even counterproductive effects. For example, state action intending to
suppress a religion (ranging from persecution of leaders to milder discriminatory treatment) will generate pressures for adherents to leave the religion
by increasing the cost of their religious activities. However, these negative
incentives will often be counteracted by an increase in perceived credibility
of the religion lent to it by the sacrifices of religious leaders and adherents.
These sacrifices can be interpreted as mutually reinforcing signals to both
adherents and outsiders of the value of the religion and of the strength of
religious commitment.299 Depending on the interplay between the two factors this phenomenon can, at times, result in a reduction of overall numbers but preservation of a highly-committed core that continues to operate
underground.300 At other times, especially when the adverse actions are
295. See Amitai Aviram, Allocating Regulatory Resources, 37 J. CORP. L. 739, 743– 44
(2011).
296. See Dulleck, Kerschbamer & Sutter, supra note 51, at 526– 27.
297. See Chaserant & Harnay, supra note 52, at 284– 85; Roe & Sheldon, supra note
292, at 1021.
298. See LARRY WITHAM, MARKETPLACE OF THE GODS: HOW ECONOMICS EXPLAINS RELIGION 61– 62 (2010); ANTHONY GILL, THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 41– 42
(2008).
299. See RODNEY STARK & ROGER FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH: EXPLAINING THE HUMAN SIDE OF
RELIGION 106– 13 (2000).
300. For example, the vigorously enforced criminalization of the Falungong sect by
the Chinese government has largely eliminated their public presence in China without
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milder and/or successfully infused with theological meaning, it promotes
overall growth.301
This complication, arising from the credence goods nature of religion,
directly implicates the attainment of the purported state objectives that
underpin the prosecutions and convictions of religious fraudulent sex.
Beyond the commonly touted protection of “naı̈ve and vulnerable woman/
girls,”302 the courts also express hope that such convictions would serve as
warnings and cautions to people who are otherwise very superstitious.303
Putting aside the constitutional defects of the mechanisms in which these
objectives are pursued and the questionable normative merits of those
objectives,304 the more instant issue is that such state actions may be
counterproductive vis-à-vis the purported objectives.
The prosecutions and convictions of religious fraudulent sex undeniably has a deterring effect on potential fraudsters. The rather high rate of
conviction and the typical substantial prison terms of at least a couple of
years will dissuade at least some potential fraudsters on the margins from
committing the offence, even if the absolute number of prosecutions is
low.305 However, the problem is that this positive impact (the objective of
reducing such crime) may be outweighed by the enhancement of perceived
credibility of such religious pretenses that resulted from state intervention.
This enhancement of credibility can manifest in three ways. First,
state intervention in a particular market will generate a sense of security
among market participants. This can sometimes lead to an inefficient
reduction in victims’ precaution as is noted in general economic literaeradicating the continued practice of its teachings in private/secret. See JAMES W. TONG,
REVENGE OF THE FORBIDDEN CITY: THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FALUNGONG IN CHINA, 19992005 205 (2009); Anne S.Y. Cheung, In Search of a Theory of Cult and Freedom of Religion
in China: the Case of Falun Gong, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 1, 21– 26 (2004).
301. To use another example from China, only state-sanctioned religious organizations are considered legal. Independent Protestant “churches” that refused to join the
official Protestant church organization are thus technically in a state of legal ambiguity
that involves general tolerance (but no official reorganization) punctuated with occasional and limited crackdowns. However, this has not impeded the continued growth of
such “churches.” See Fenggang Yang, The Red, Black, and Gray Markets of Religion in
China, 47 SOC. Q. 93, 97– 98 (2006); Jacqueline E. Wenger, Official vs. Underground
Protestant Churhes in China: Challenges for Reconciliation and Social Influence, 46 REV.
RELIGIOUS RES. 169, 170– 71 (2004).
302. E.g., Yuen Yuk Kin, CACC454/2011, ¶ 96; Chow Kam Wah, [2012] HKCU 2447,
¶ 38; Au Yeung Kwok Fu, H.K.C. 223, ¶ 13.
303. See Au Yeung Kwok Fu, H.K.C. 223. See also Hong Kong v. Tang Tsin Cheung,
CACC89/2010, [2011] (C.A.) (endorsing such objective in the context of a religious
fraud case that involved sexual intercourse but the defendant was charged with the common law offences of conspiracy to defraud).
304. See supra Part II. It is also important to note that the former rationale of protecting “naı̈ve and vulnerable women/girls” has a disturbing paternalistic and gendered
undertone. Cf., McJunkin, supra note 22, at 21– 34 (arguing that the law’s reluctance to
criminalize fraudulent sex in the U.S. reflects an underlying notion of seduction based
on normative masculinity where men derive power and social status through sexual
conquest).
305. For a discussion of deterrence from the economic perspective, see RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 278– 86 (8th ed. 2011).
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ture.306 However, for credence goods, there is also going to be an increase
in perceived credibility among the suppliers by consumers. Consumers
may feel that the supplier is credible (or more credible than if completely
unregulated) on the basis that the supplier is willing to operate under risk
of state sanctions for fraudulent behaviors. Insofar as the state intervention/prosecution is conspicuous, but is in fact rare and random (as in the
case of religious fraudulent sex in Hong Kong),307 there is a real likelihood
that a large swath of otherwise suspect practices would be perceived as
being legitimate and legal by consumers on the basis that the perpetrators
have not been prosecuted.
Second, this enhancement of credibility is aggravated by the crude
sincerity test employed to prosecute religious fraudulent sex. The allusion
to “sincerity” is a judiciary concession that such religious practices may be
genuine in other instances. This will dilute the intended warning or caution that the court hopes to signal to “naı̈ve and vulnerable” persons.
Indeed, this dilution is particularly pronounced in the instances where the
defendant is acquitted.308 In this regard, it would have been ironically better if the courts just went all out to explicitly and consistently proclaim that
sex can never be part of religious ritual as a matter of fact.309 That would
at least have been more effective as a matter of public education rather
than the current predicament of violating constitutional rights without
attaining the purported policy objectives.
Third, is the ability for potential fraudsters to draw on the discriminatory nature of the legal system to negate any diminishment of credibility
from state intervention. Here, it is important to note that whereas a more
explicit judicial rejection of such practices would increase the level of skepticism of potential victims toward such practices,310 the credibility of the
perpetrator of such practices is not negated and may still receive an unintended boost. As noted above, the religious premise of all defendants’ representation/pretenses is Chinese folk religions.311 This is significant
306. See supra CONCLUSION. See also GREENAWALT, supra note 34, at 114– 15 (“If people are aware that the state does not involve itself in prosecutions for spiritual fraud,
they will be on notice they must rely on themselves for protection. . . . A clear legal rule
against enforcement for fraud might reinforce most people’s reliance on their own judgment about essentially religious claims.”).
307. See also Aviram, supra note 295, at 745– 48 (discussing the various types of “placebo effects” of law enforcement and the different impact of behaviors and efficiency
considerations).
308. See supra Part I.B.7.
309. See R v. William Case, (1850) 1 Den. 580, 582– 83 (1850) (Eng. C.A.) (“The
notion that a medical man might lawfully adopt such a mode of treatment [that involves
sexual intercourse] is not to be tolerated in a Court of justice. He would have committed
a high ecclesiastical offence at all events”).
310. For a research study that examined how the impact of forewarning to at-risk
fraud victims and found that such warnings provided an effective though somewhat
temporary reduction of the susceptibility to fraud, see Susanne Scheibe et al., Forewarning Reduces Fraud Susceptibility in Vulnerable Consumers, 36 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCH.
272, 275– 78 (2014).
311. See supra Part I.B.8.
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beyond the implications of the determining religious truth.312 Despite frequent, proud proclamations of perceived religious liberty in Hong Kong, in
contrast with China,313 British colonial rule has produced many instances
of explicit discrimination and hostility toward Chinese religions,314 some
of which remain in force today. For example, religious specialists from
Buddhism, Taoism, and Chinese folk religions remain conspicuously omitted from the exemption of jury service, in contrast to the equivalent from
Christianity, Judaism (since 1948), or Hinduism and Islam (since
1997).315 More blatant is the Chinese Temples Ordinance that— on the
purported objectives of tackling “pseudo-religious establishments” exploiting ignorant masses316— subject only Chinese religions317 to the requirement of mandatory registration, building restrictions, power of search and
seizure without warrant, and most starkly, the “absolute control” by a government regulatory body over all the financial assets of all Chinese temples.318 Under such circumstances, skepticism and sanctions by a legal
system that is ostensibly hostile to a particular form of religious practices
could be easily explained away by a potential fraudster as straightforward
religious discrimination and accepted as such by the substantial segment
of the population who have continued to believe and practice such “superstitious” beliefs despite more than a century of such state hostility.319
More sociological research is necessary to tease out the precise dynamics of how these prosecutions have actually affected the credibility of the
purported practitioners of these religious practices and also the general
operation of such a “market” for divine interventions. At this juncture, it
suffices to note that despite the series of high-profile prosecutions that
have received widespread media reports, especially among the tabloids,320
312. See supra Part I.C.
313. See e.g., Thomas In-sing Leung, Crises and Transformation: the Implications of
1997 for Christian Organizations in Hong Kong, in POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN HONG KONG
TOWARDS 1997 62, 75– 78 (Charles Burton ed., 1992). See also Michael Ng, When Silence
Speaks: Press Censorship and Rule of Law in British Hong Kong, 1850s– 1940s, 29 LAW &
LITERATURE, 425, 436– 38, 450 (2017) (a historical archival survey that reveals the colonial government’s “active and pre-emptive press censorship of Chinese newspapers” in
Hong Kong and “demythologizes the much-congratulated rule of law in the former
colony.”).
314. See CHEN, supra n.196 and accompanying text.
315. See Jury Ordinance, (1997) Caps. 3, 8, §§ 5(1)(h), (ha) & (hb) (H.K.).
316. See Fok Ho Chiu v. The Chinese Temples Committee, [2003] HCAL 13/2003
(H.K.).
317. “Chinese temples” are defined to cover “all Miu ( temples), Tsz ( , Buddhist
monasteries), Kun and To Yuen (
, Taoist monasteries) and Om ( ) nunneries)”. Chinese Temples Ordinance, (1928) Cap. 153, § 2 (H.K.).
318. See id. §§ 4, 5, 7 & 14. See Jianlin Chen, Hong Kong’s Chinese Temples Ordinance:
A Cautionary Case Study of Discriminatory and Misguided Regulation of Religious Fraud,
J.L. & RELIGION (forthcoming).
319. See supra I.A.1.
320. It is common— and totally unsurprising given the explosive combination of sex,
fraud and the supernatural— that tabloids have devoted widespread and continuous coverage throughout the court proceedings. E.g., Sexual Transfer, HONG KONG NEWS, https:/
/www.hk01.com/tag/14108 [https://perma.cc/UTK5-TKA3] (last visited Feb. 1, 2018)
(dedicating a specific tag for the Law Wai Leuk case).
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such cases are still regularly available for prosecution without any noticeable increase in sophistication in deception methods. This suggests that
these prosecutions have not achieved their intended effect.
Conclusion
This Article’s case study of the prosecutions and convictions of religious fraudulent sex in Hong Kong highlights the constitutional and normative deficiencies of such state actions. Such litigation compels the courts to
engage with the issue of religious falsehood which— given the elusive and
unverifiable nature of the divine— often results in instinctive rejection of
perceived unorthodox religious doctrines/practices even among professional judges. Furthermore, sex for religious purposes— no less where the
underlying concern is materialistic in nature (e.g., seeking supernatural
assistance to advance career)— is not the type of activity which the state
would wish to encourage especially when compared to sex for romantic
purposes. This raises critical questions as to the merits of such prosecution in the context where romantic fraudulent sex is not similarly prosecuted despite falling under the scope of the relevant provision.
More broadly, this case study demonstrates the importance of
approaching criminalizing fraudulent sex not simply as a matter of sexual
offences, but as a matter of fraud regulation. Prosecuting religious fraudulent sex is an act of religious regulation, which will affect the conduct of
affairs in the religious realm as much as the sexual sphere. Thus, this Article argues for greater appreciation and analysis of the different legal and
normative considerations that would arise based on the types of fraudulent
pretenses employed. In this regard, economic insights as the precise, if
sometime counter-intuitive, dynamics between fraud, laws and individual’s
behaviors can expose the unintended consequences of fraudulent sex
offences and their enforcement.

